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Abstract—In this part of the paper, we obtain analytical results
for the case that transport costs are not small (complement of
Part I), and combine them with the results in Part I of the paper
to provide general results for all values of transport costs. We
show that, in general, if an SPNE exists, it would be one of the
five possible strategies each of which we explicitly characterize.
We also prove that when EUs have sufficiently high inertia for
at least one of the ISPs, there exists a unique SPNE with a non-
neutral outcome in which both of the ISPs are active, and the CP
offers her content with free quality on the neutral ISP and with
premium quality on the non-neutral ISP. Moreover, we show that
an SPNE does not always exist. We also analyze a benchmark
case in which both ISPs are neutral, and prove that there exists a
unique SPNE in which the CP offers her content with free quality
on both ISPs, and both ISPs are active. We also provide extensive
numerical results and discussions for all ranges of transport costs.
Simulation results suggest that if the SPNE exists, it would be
unique. In addition, results reveal that the neutral ISP receives
a lower payoff and the non-neutral ISP receives a higher payoff
(most of the time) in a non-neutral scenario. However, we also
identify scenarios in which the non-neutral ISP loses payoff by
adopting non-neutrality. In addition, we show that a non-neutral
regime yields a higher welfare for EUs than a neutral one if
the market power of the non-neutral ISP is small, the sensitivity
of EUs (respectively, the CP) to the quality is low (respectively,
high), or a combinations of these factors.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the first part of the paper, we focused on the case that
the transport costs are lower than a threshold, i.e. the case
that EUs can switch between ISPs relatively easy. We proved
that when transport costs are small and if the SPNE exists,
then the equilibrium strategy of the CP would be to offer her
content on only the non-neutral ISP. Depending on the values
of the transport costs, at the SPNE, either both ISPs would be
active (have positive share of EUs), or only the non-neutral
ISP would be active. We also proved that if the transport costs
are sufficiently small (smaller than another threshold), then the
SPNE exists and is unique. In this case, at the SPNE outcome
of the market, only the non-neutral ISP would be active and
the neutral one would be driven out of the market.
In this part, we use the same system model as in the previous
part of the paper. However, we consider the complement of
the previous part, where transport costs are not small and EUs
cannot easily switch between ISPs. This case often happens in
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practice in the Internet market, e.g. when ISPs bundle Internet
access with other services (e.g. cable, phone). In this case, an
EU may incur additional expenses for other services if she
buys Internet access from another ISP. Another example of
high inertia of EUs is the case in which EUs require different
devices to access the Internet through different ISPs (e.g.
different devices for cable and DSL services), i.e. high set
up costs.
Analytical Results
First, we obtain analytical results for the case that transport
costs are not small (complement of the previous part), and
combine them with the results in the first part of the paper to
provide general results for all values of transport costs. We
show that, in general, if an SPNE exists, it would be one
of the five possible strategies each of which we explicitly
characterize. In some of these strategies, the CP offers her
content on only the non-neutral ISP, and in the rest she offers
her content on both ISPs. In addition, in one of the outcomes,
all EUs pay the Internet access fee to the non-neutral ISP, i.e.
the neutral ISP is driven out of the market. However, in the
rest, both ISPs receive a positive share of EUs, i.e. both ISPs
are active. In addition, we provide specific instances with no
SPNE. This shows that an SPNE does not always exist. Our
analysis reveals that the market would have a more diverse set
of equilibrium outcomes in comparison to Part I of the paper
[1].
Second, we focus on a special case in which EUs have
sufficiently high inertia for at least one of the ISPs. We prove
that in this case, there exists a unique SPNE with a non-
neutral outcome, and we explicitly characterize the SPNE. In
the unique SPNE, both of the ISPs are active, and the CP
offers her content with free quality on the neutral ISP and
with premium quality on the non-neutral ISP.
Third, we consider a benchmark case in which both ISPs are
neutral. In this case, we prove that regardless of the transport
costs, there exists a unique SPNE, in which the CP offers her
content over both ISPs with free quality, and both ISPs would
be active. We use the results of this case, as a benchmark for
comparing with the results of our model.
Numerical Results
We provide numerical results for all ranges of transport
costs. Numerical results confirm our theoretical results that
when the transport costs are small enough, then the SPNE
exists and is unique. They also confirm that when the transport
costs are large enough, then the SPNE with a non-neutral
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2outcome uniquely exists. Numerical results reveal that if the
inertia of EUs for ISPs is between these two extreme cases
(high and low inertias) but still small enough, the game has an
SPNE outcome in which both of the ISPs are active, but the
CP offers her content with premium quality and only on the
non-neutral ISP. Numerical results also reveal that if the inertia
of EUs for ISPs is between the two extreme cases and large
enough, then the game has no SPNE. Results of simulation
over large sets of parameters also suggest that in all scenarios,
the SPNE is unique if it were to exist.
Numerical results reveal that the neutral ISP loses payoff
in all of the SPNE outcomes in comparison to the benchamrk
case. In addition, for a wide range of parameters, the non-
neutral ISP receives a better payoff under a non-neutral sce-
nario. This implies that it is beneficial for ISPs to operate as
non-neutral, if they have the choice. However, switching to a
non-neutral regime is not always profitable for ISPs. If EUs or
the CP are not sensitive to the quality of the content delivered
and the market power of the non-neutral ISP is small, then
ISPs are better off staying neutral.
Results also reveal that the sensitivity of the EUs and the
CP, and the market power of ISPs substantially influences the
welfare of EUs (EUW) in neutral and non-neutral scenarios.
EUW would be higher in a non-neutral setting if (i) the market
power of the non-neutral ISP is low, (ii) the sensitivity of the
CP to the quality is high, or (iii) EUs are not very sensitive
to the quality, or a combination of these conditions. In these
cases a cheaper Internet access fee would be charged to the
EUs by the non-neutral ISP which yields a higher EUW.
Organization of the Paper
Note that the model herein is similar to the one presented
in Part I. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We
present the results under the assumption that the transport costs
are not small for the case of one neutral and one non-neutral
ISPs in Section II. In Section III, we present the results for the
benchmark case, i.e. both ISPs neutral. All proofs are presented
in the Appendices. In Section IV, we summarize and discuss
about the key results of the paper. We provide numerical
examples spanning Part I and II in Section V. Finally, we
comment on some of the assumptions of the model and their
generalizations in Section VI.
Remark 1. We refer to the equations, theorems, lemmas, etc
of the previous part using “I” suffix, e.g. Theorem 1-I and
Equation (1)-I refers to the Theorem 1 and Equation (1) of
Part I, respectively.
II. THE SUB-GAME PERFECT NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In Part I, we characterized the SPNE(s) for the case that
the transport costs are smaller than a threshold, specifically
tN + tNoN ≤ κuq˜p. Now, in this section, we characterize the
SPNE(s) for the complement of this case, i.e. tN + tNoN >
κuq˜p. Note that, in Part I, the analysis for Stages 2 to 4 was
done regardless of the assumption on the transport costs. Thus,
we can use the equilibrium strategies of these stages, and only
need to characterize the equilibrium strategies of Stage 1, under
the assumption that tN + tNoN > κuq˜p.
Stage 1: ISPs determine peqN and p
eq
NoN :
In this section, we characterize the NE strategies peqN and
peqNoN using (1)-I for the case that tN + tNoN > κuq˜p. First,
in Theorem 1, we characterize all possible NE strategies by
which zeq = 1. In Theorem 2, we prove that when one of the
inertias is large, the only NE strategy by which zeq = 1 is
the third candidate strategy of Theorem 1. Then, we focus on
characterizing NE strategies by which zeq = 0. In Theorem 3,
we characterize the only candidate NE strategy by which zeq =
0.
Similar to the previous part of the paper, and without loss of
generality, in the equilibrium, peqN ≥ c.1 In addition, if z = 0,
peqNoN ≥ c. Similar to the previous part, if 0 ≤ xn ≤ 1, i.e.
(qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) ∈ F I , from (5)-I, the payoff of neutral and non-
neutral ISPs are as follow:
piN (pN ) = (pN − c) tNoN + κu(qN − qNoN ) + pNoN − pN
tN + tNoN
(1)
piNoN (pNoN , p˜) = (pNoN − c) tN + κu(qNoN − qN ) + pN − pNoN
tN + tNoN
+ zqNoN p˜
(2)
Given the strategies of the CP and EUs described in the
previous part of the paper, in the following theorem we
characterize the NE strategies by which zeq = 1 when
q˜p <
tN+tNoN
κu
:
Theorem 1. If q˜p < tN+tNoNκu , then the only possible NE
strategies by which (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) ∈ F1, i.e. zeq = 1, are:
1) If ∆p ≤ κuq˜p − tNoN , then peqNoN = c+ κuq˜p − tNoN
and peqN = c.
2) If (i) κuq˜p − tNoN < ∆peq < κu(2q˜p − q˜f ) −
tNoN or tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ) < ∆peq < tN +
κuq˜p, then p
eq
NoN = c +
tNoN+2tN+q˜p(κu−2κad)
3 and
peqN = c +
2tNoN+tN−q˜p(κu+κad)
3 , and pi
eq
NoN =
piNoN (p˜
eq
NoN , p˜t,2). The necessary conditions: (ii) q˜p ≤
2tNoN+tN
κu+κad
, and (iii) pieqNoN > piNoN,z=0(p˜
eq
NoN , p˜).
3) If (i) κu(2q˜p − q˜f ) − tNoN < ∆peq < tN + κu(q˜p −
q˜f ), then p
eq
NoN = c +
tNoN+2tN+(q˜p−q˜f )(κu−2κad)
3
and peqN = c +
2tNoN+tN−(q˜p−q˜f )(κu+κad)
3 , and
pieqNoN = piNoN (p˜
eq
NoN , p˜t,3). The necessary condi-
tions: (ii) q˜p − q˜f ≤ 2tNoN+tNκu+κad , and (iii) pi
eq
NoN >
piNoN,z=0(p˜
eq
NoN , p˜).
4) peqNoN = c and p
eq
N = c − κu(2q˜p − q˜f ) + tNoN ,
and pieqNoN = piNoN (p˜
eq
NoN , p˜t,3). The necessary con-
ditions: (i) 2q˜p − q˜f ≤ tNoNκu and (ii) pi
eq
NoN >
piNoN,z=0(p˜
eq
NoN , p˜).
Remark 2. Note that these candidate strategies are NE if
and only if the conditions listed in the theorem hold and no
unilateral deviation is profitable for each of the ISPs.
We will show in the next corollary that the first two sets of
strategies are associated with the case that the CP offers with
1Note that if nN > 0 then pN < c yields a negative payoff for the neutral
ISP. Thus, no pN < c can be an equilibrium payoff. If nN = 0, the value of
pN is of no importance. Therefore, without loss of generality we can consider
pN ≥ c.
3premium quality on ISP NoN and with zero quality on ISP
N. With the first strategies, ISP N would be driven out of the
market, while with the second strategy, ISP N would be active.
The third and fourth set of strategies are associated with the
case that both ISPs are active and the CP offers her content
with premium quality on ISP NoN and with free quality on
ISP N.
Corollary 1. If Strategy 1 of Theorem 1 is an NE, it yields
p˜eq = p˜t,1 = κad(1 − q˜fq˜p ), (q
eq
N , q
eq
NoN ) = (0, q˜p) ∈ FL1 ,
neqN = 0, and n
eq
NoN = 1. If Strategy 2 of Theorem 1 is an
NE, it yields p˜eq = p˜t,2 = κad(n
eq
NoN − q˜fq˜p ), (q
eq
N , q
eq
NoN ) =
(0, q˜p) ∈ F I1 , neqN = tN+2tNoN−q˜p(κu+κad)3(tN+tNoN ) , and n
eq
NoN =
2tN+tNoN+q˜p(κu+κad)
3(tN+tNoN )
. If Strategy 3 of Theorem 1 is an NE,
it yields p˜eq = p˜t,3 = κadn
eq
NoN (1 − q˜fq˜p ), (q
eq
N , q
eq
NoN ) =
(q˜f , q˜p) ∈ F I1 , neqN = tN+2tNoN−(q˜p−q˜f )(κu+κad)3(tN+tNoN ) , and
neqNoN =
2tN+tNoN+(q˜p−q˜f )(κu+κad)
3(tN+tNoN )
. If Strategy 4 of Theo-
rem 1 is an NE, it yields p˜eq = p˜t,3 = κadn
eq
NoN (1 − q˜fq˜p ),
(qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (q˜f , q˜p) ∈ F I1 , neqN = κuq˜ptN+tNoN , and n
eq
NoN =
tN+tNoN−κuq˜p
tN+tNoN
.
Next, we prove that when either of the transport costs is
large enough, then the NE strategy by which zeq = 1 is the
third candidate strategy of the previous theorem.
Theorem 2. When either tN or tNoN is large enough, for
the case that q˜p < tN+tNoNκu , the only NE strategy by which
zeq = 1 is peqNoN = c+
tNoN+2tN+(q˜p−q˜f )(κu−2κad)
3 and p
eq
N =
c+
2tNoN+tN−(q˜p−q˜f )(κu+κad)
3 .
Proof of Theorem 2 is presented in Appendix B.
Remark 3. Note that when at least one of tN and tNoN is
large, then the effect of q˜p can be ignored. Thus, this scenario
can be considered to be similar to the case that both ISPs are
neutral, i.e. the benchmark case. Later, in Theorem 4, we prove
that a unique SPNE exists in this case, and it is similar to the
NE strategies characterized in Theorem 2 with q˜p = q˜f .
Now, we characterize the equilibrium strategy by which
zeq = 0. In Theorem 3, we characterize the only candidate
NE strategy by which zeq = 0, when inertias are not small.
Theorem 3. If q˜p < tN+tNoNκu , the only possible NE strategy
by which (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) ∈ F0, i.e. zeq = 0 is peqN = c +
1
3 (2tNoN+tN ) and p
eq
NoN = c+
1
3 (2tN+tNoN ). The necessary
condition for this strategy to be a candidate NE strategy is
piNoN (p
eq
NoN , z = 0) ≥ piNoN (peqNoN , p˜t).
Remark 4. This strategy is an NE strategy if and only if there
is no unilateral profitable deviation for any of the ISPs.
Corollary 2. If the strategy of Theorem 3 is an NE, it yields
(qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (q˜f , q˜f ) ∈ FL0 , neqN = 2tNoN+tN3(tNoN+tN ) , and
neqNoN =
2tN+tNoN
3(tN+tNoN )
. Since zeq = 0, p˜eq is of no importance.
III. BENCHMARK CASE: A NEUTRAL REGIME
In this section, we consider a benchmark case in which
both ISPs are forced to be neutral. Our goal is to find the
SPNE when both ISPs are neutral. We compare the results of
the benchmark case with the results we found in the previous
section. Note that we do not restrict the analysis of this section
to any particular range of transport costs, and the analysis is
done for a general case.
First, we find the equilibrium strategies for this benchmark
case. The main result of this section is Theorem 4. Then, in
Corollary 3, we characterize the equilibrium outcome of the
game given the equilibrium strategies.
In order to characterize the equilibrium in this case, we can
consider a simple change to our previous model and use some
of the previous results. We assume that in this case, the CP
chooses zeq = 0, regardless of the strategy of ISPs. Thus,
(qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) ∈ F0, and as a result both ISPs are neutral.
Note that in this case, the equilibrium strategy of Stage 4
is similar as before, and the equilibrium strategy of Stage 3
is characterized in Theorem 1-I. Recall that in Theorem 1-I,
we characterize the equilibrium strategies within F0 without
considering the strategies in F1. In addition, note that the
strategy of Stage 2 is of no importance since with zeq = 0,
the effect of p˜ would be eliminated in all analyses. Thus, we
only need to find the new equilibrium strategies in Stage 1 of
the game:
Theorem 4. The unique NE strategies chosen by the ISP are
peqN = c+
1
3 (2tNoN + tN ) and p
eq
NoN = c+
1
3 (2tN + tNoN ).
Remark 5. Note that if tN (respectively, tNoN ) increases,
pNoN (respectively, pN ) increases with a rate 23 rd the rate
of the growth of this transport cost. In addition, counter-
intuitively, pN (respectively, pNoN ) also increases with a rate
1
3 rd of the rate of growth of tN (respectively, tNoN ). This
counter-intuitive result (Internet access fee of an ISP being an
increasing function of the transport cost of this ISP) is because
of competition between ISPs: For example, with the increase
of tNoN , the neutral ISP can set a higher price. This allows
her competitor, i.e. ISP NoN, to increases her price.
Now, using the equilibrium strategies characterized previ-
ously, we characterize the equilibrium outcome of the game in
a neutral setting in the following corollary:
Corollary 3. If both ISPs are neutral, then in the equilibrium,
ISPs chooses peqN = c +
1
3 (2tNoN + tN ) and p
eq
NoN = c +
1
3 (2tN+tNoN ) as the Internet access fees. The CP chooses the
vector of qualities (qeqN , q
eq
N ) = (q˜f , q˜f ). The fraction of EUs
with each ISP is neqN =
2tNoN+tN
3(tNoN+tN )
and neqNoN =
2tN+tNoN
3(tNoN+tN )
.
Results follow from Theorem 1-I (note that −tNoN <
∆peq < tN ), and (5)-I.
IV. THE OUTCOME OF THE GAME AND DISCUSSIONS
First, in Section IV-A, we summarize, discuss, and interpret
the possible outcomes of the model characterized in Part I
and II. Then, in Section IV-B, we summarize and discuss the
results for a benchmark case in which both ISPs are neutral.
4A. Possible Outcomes of the Market
Recall that in Section II, we have characterized all the
possible SPNE strategies and their outcomes in Theorems 6-
I, 1, and 3, and Corollaries 1-I, 1, and 2. In this section, we
summarize, discuss, and interpret these strategies.
Candidate Strategy (a): peqNoN = c+κuq˜p−tNoN , peqN = c,
zeq = 1, i.e. the CP pays for the premium quality, p˜eq =
p˜t,1 = κad(1 − q˜fq˜p ), (q
eq
N , q
eq
NoN ) = (0, q˜p) ∈ FL1 , neqN = 0,
and neqNoN = 1 (Theorem 6-I-1 and Theorem 1-1). Also, recall
that in Theorems 5-I and 6-I, we prove that when tN and tNoN
are sufficiently small, i.e. EUs are not locked-in with ISPs, then
the unique SPNE of the game is (a).
This strategy represents the outcome of the market in which
the CP offers the content with premium quality and pays the
side-payment to the non-neutral ISP. Note that EUs can receive
a better quality of content on the non-neutral ISP, and that
yields a better advertisement revenue for the CP. Thus, in the
equilibrium, the CP offers her content only on the non-neutral
ISP to increase the number of EUs connecting to the Internet
via the non-neutral ISP. By doing so, given the conditions of
this candidate strategy, all EUs would join the non-neutral ISP
and the neutral ISP would be driven out of the market.
In addition, note that the Internet access fee chosen by ISP
NoN (peqNoN ) increases with (i) increasing the sensitivity of
end-users to the quality (κu), (ii) increasing the value of the
premium quality (q˜p), and (iii) decreasing the transport cost of
ISP NoN (tNoN )2.
Moreover, note that the side-payment charged for the pre-
mium quality (p˜eq q˜p) is positive, and is dependent on (i)
the sensitivity of the payoff of the CP to the quality of the
advertisement, i.e. κad, and (ii) the difference between the
premium and free quality, i.e. q˜p − q˜f . The latter implies
that ISP NoN chooses the side-payment in proportion to the
additional value created for the CP.
Candidate Strategy (b): peqNoN = c +
tNoN+2tN+q˜p(κu−2κad)
3 , p
eq
N = c +
2tNoN+tN−q˜p(κu+κad)
3 ,
zeq = 1, p˜eq = p˜t,2 = κad(n
eq
NoN − q˜fq˜p ),
(qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (0, q˜p) ∈ F I1 , neqN = tN+2tNoN−q˜p(κu+κad)3(tN+tNoN ) ,
and neqNoN =
2tN+tNoN+q˜p(κu+κad)
3(tN+tNoN )
(Theorem 6-I-2 and
Theorem 1-2).
Candidate strategy (b) represents the outcome of the market
in which both ISPs are active. However, similar to (a), with
this outcome, the CP does not offer her content over the neutral
ISP, and offers her content only over the non-neutral ISP with
premium quality. Thus, although the CP stops offering her
content on the neutral ISP, she cannot move all EUs to ISP
NoN. The loss in the number of EUs would be compensated by
receiving higher advertisement revenue (due to the premium
quality) and paying a lower side payment to ISP NoN (will be
explained the paragraph discussing the side payment).
It is noteworthy to observe that if tN (respectively, tNoN )
increases, peqNoN (respectively, p
eq
N ) increases with a rate
2
3 rd
the rate of the growth of this transport cost. This is intuitive.
2Note that tNoN has an inverse relationship with the market power of ISP
NoN if tN is fixed.
The higher tN (while tNoN fixed), the higher would be the
market power of ISP NoN, and subsequently the higher would
be peqNoN . In addition, counter-intuitively, pN (respectively,
pNoN ) also increases with a rate 13 rd of the rate of growth of
tN (respectively, tNoN ). This counter-intuitive result (Internet
access fee of an ISP being an increasing function of the
transport cost of this ISP) is because of competition between
ISPs3.
In addition, note that peqN is a decreasing function of q˜p, κu,
and κad: The higher the premium quality or the sensitivity
of EUs and the CP to the quality, the lower would be the
Internet access fee of ISP N. On the other hand, the relationship
between these parameters and peqNoN is more complicated. The
Internet access fee of ISP NoN is increasing with respect to
the sensitivity of EUs to the quality, and is decreasing with
respect to the sensitivity of the CP to the quality. Thus, the
more the CP is sensitive to the quality, the more the ISP NoN
provides subsidies for EUs (cheaper Internet access fees), and
compensates the payoff through charging the CP. In addition,
note that peqNoN is decreasing or increasing with respect to the
amount of premium quality (q˜p) depending on the sensitivity of
EUs and the CP to the quality: If the sensitivity of EUs to the
quality dominates the sensitivity of the CP (κu > 2κad), then
peqNoN is increasing with respect to q˜p. If not, then ISP NoN
can generate more revenue from the CP, and thus provide a
cheaper Internet access fee for EUs. The higher this sensitivity,
the higher would be the side payment from the CP (as we can
see from the expression of p˜eq), and the higher would be the
discount on the Internet access fees for EUs.
Moreover, note that the side-payment charged for the pre-
mium quality (p˜eq q˜p) is increasing with respect to (i) κad (the
sensitivity of the CP to the quality), (ii) the premium quality
(q˜p), (iii) number of EUs with the non-neutral ISP (n
eq
NoN ),
and it is decreasing with respect to the free quality (q˜f ). Note
that since in this case nNoN < 1, the side payment would be
lower than the side payment in candidate strategy (a). This
side-payment can be positive or negative. However, as we
explain later, the numerical results reveal that the side-payment
is positive whenever this candidate strategy is an NE.
In addition, note that nNoN is increasing with respect to the
premium quality, i.e. q˜p, and the sensitivity of the CP and EUs
to the quality, i.e. κu and κad. The relationship between nNoN
and the transport costs, i.e. tN and tNoN is more complex and
is discussed in Section V-A.4
Candidate Strategy (c): peqNoN = c +
tNoN+2tN+(q˜p−q˜f )(κu−2κad)
3 , p
eq
N = c +
2tNoN+tN−(q˜p−q˜f )(κu+κad)
3 , z
eq = 1, p˜eq = p˜t,3 =
κadn
eq
NoN (1 − q˜fq˜p ), (q
eq
N , q
eq
NoN ) = (q˜f , q˜p) ∈ F I1 ,
neqN =
tN+2tNoN−(q˜p−q˜f )(κu+κad)
3(tN+tNoN )
, and neqNoN =
3For example, with the increase of tNoN , EUs have more incentive to join
the neutral ISP and less incentive to switch to the non-neutral ISP. Thus the
neutral ISP can set a higher price for EUs. This allows her competitor, i.e.
ISP NoN, to increases her price, but with a rate lower than the rate by which
the price of ISP N increases.
4Recall that nN = 1−nNoN . Thus, the relationship between nN and the
parameters are the inverse of that of nNoN .
52tN+tNoN+(q˜p−q˜f )(κu+κad)
3(tN+tNoN )
(Theorem 1-3). In Theorem 2, we
prove that when either of tN or tNoN is large, then the only
candidate strategy by which zeq = 1 is (c).
Candidate strategy (c) represents the outcome of the market
in which both ISPs are active, and the CP offers her content
over both ISPs, with free quality on the neutral ISP and with
premium quality on the non-neutral one.
The dependencies of the access fees (peqN and p
eq
NoN ) to
tN , tNoN , κu, and κad are the same as what described for
candidate strategy (b). In addition, note that peqN is decreasing
with the difference between the premium and free qualities,
i.e. q˜p− q˜f , and peqNoN is decreasing or increasing with respect
to the difference in the qualities depending on the sensitivity
of EUs and the CP to the quality (similar to the description
for the candidate strategy (b)).
Moreover, note that the side-payment charged for the pre-
mium quality (p˜eq q˜p) is increasing with respect to (i) κad
(the sensitivity of the CP to the quality), (ii) the difference
between the premium and free qualities (q˜p− q˜f ), (iii) number
of EUs with the non-neutral ISP (neqNoN ). This side-payment is
always positive. The dependencies of nNoN to the parameters
is similar to what described for candidate strategy (b), with the
difference that nNoN depends on the difference in the qualities,
i.e. q˜p − q˜f , instead of only q˜p.
Note that when either of tN or tNoN is large, then (c) is
the only candidate strategy by which zeq = 1. First, recall that
the payoff that an ISP receives depends on both the number of
EUs and the Internet connection fee of that ISP. In addition, we
discussed that when either of tN or tNoN is large, then both
of the Internet connection fees would be large in candidate
strategies (b) and (c). It turns out that when tN or tNoN
is large, ISPs prefer candidate strategies (b) and (c) to the
strategies by which they discount the price heavily to attract
EUs (Candidate strategies (a) and (d)).
Moreover, when both ISPs are active, large tNoN or tN
decreases the effect of quality of the content on the decision of
EUs (both through the high transport costs and increase in the
Internet access fees). Thus, the CP cannot control the number
of EUs with each ISP by strategically controlling her quality.
Therefore the CP simply chooses to provide with maximum
possible quality on both ISPs instead of choosing strategic
qualities to control EUs with each ISP. Note that the only
candidate strategy that yields this outcome is (c).
Candidate Strategy (d): peqNoN = c, p
eq
N = c − κu(2q˜p −
q˜f ) + tNoN , zeq = 1, p˜eq = p˜t,3 = κadn
eq
NoN (1 − q˜fq˜p ),
(qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (q˜f , q˜p) ∈ F I1 , neqN = κuq˜ptN+tNoN , and n
eq
NoN =
tN+tNoN−κuq˜p
tN+tNoN
(Theorem 1-4).
Candidate strategy (d) and its outcome represent the scenario
in which the non-neutral ISP is forced to provide a low Internet
access fee for EUs. This strategy can only be valid when tNoN
is large (so that peqN ≥ c). In other words, the only scenario that
this strategy is possible is when EUs are reluctant joining the
non-neutral ISP. Thus, this ISP should provide large discounts
for EUs. Note that in this case, both ISPs are active, and the
CP offers her content over both ISPs, with free quality on the
neutral ISP and with premium quality on the non-neutral one.
Note that in this case, peqN is decreasing with respect to
κu and q˜p, and increasing with respect to q˜f and tNoN . In
addition, the side payment is similar to the candidate strategy
(c).
In this candidate strategy, peqNoN is fixed, while p
eq
N is
decreasing with respect to q˜p and κu. In addition, the rate of
decrease of peqN is twice of the rate of increase of utility of EUs
from κu and q˜p when connecting to ISP NoN. Thus, The rate
of increase in the utility of EUs for ISP N is higher than that of
ISP NoN, and as result confirms, neqN would be increasing with
respect to the premium quality and the sensitivity of EUs to the
quality. In addition, peqN is increasing with tNoN . Thus, as result
confirms, neqN would be decreasing with respect to the transport
cost of ISP NoN.5 Finally, note that the Internet access fees are
independent of tN , but the utility of EUs connecting to neutral
ISP is decreasing with tN (3)-I. Thus, as result confirms, the
number of EUs with the neutral ISP, i.e. neqN , is decreasing
with respect to both tN .
Candidate Strategy (e): peqNoN = c+
1
3 (2tN+tNoN ), p
eq
N =
c + 13 (2tNoN + tN ), z
eq = 0, (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (q˜f , q˜f ) ∈ FL0 ,
neqN =
2tNoN+tN
3(tNoN+tN )
, neqNoN =
2tN+tNoN
3(tN+tNoN )
, and since zeq = 0,
p˜eq is of no importance (Theorem 3).
This case characterizes the only possible NE strategy by
which zeq = 0. This strategy and its outcome is similar to
the benchmark case presented in Section IV-B. (c) would be
reduced to (e), if q˜p = q˜f .
Remark: Note that candidate strategies in different the-
orems (defined for different regions of tN and tNoN ) can be
similar, e.g. Theorem 6-I-1 and Theorem 1-1. In addition, there
is no outcome in which the CP offers her content only on the
neutral ISP. From the expression of payoff of the CP (2)-I,
the CP can get at most κadq˜f by offering only on the neutral
ISP. On the other hand, the CP can guarantee a payoff of this
amount by offering on both ISPs and z = 0. Assumption 4-
I, i.e. the CP prefers to offer on both ISP whenever she is
indifferent, yields that the CP never choose the strategy in
which she offers only on the neutral ISP.
Interplay Between Sensitivities to Quality and the Out-
come: Intuitively, we expect that high sensitivity of EUs and
the CP to the quality, i.e. large κu and κad, respectively,
yields high payoff for the non-neutral ISP, since this ISP can
provide a premium quality and charge the EUs accordingly
to increase her payoff. Thus, the payoff can be collected
from EUs or the CP, or both. Results reveal that in all
candidate strategies ISP NoN charges the CP in proportion
to her sensitivity to the quality of the content. In addition,
in candidate strategies (a) to (c), the payoff collected from
EUs through the Internet connection fees is always increasing
with respect to the sensitivity of the EUs to the quality. In
candidate strategies (b) and (c), the Internet connection fees
are decreasing with respect to the sensitivity of the CP to
the quality. Thus, in these candidate strategies EUs receive
a discount in proportion to the sensitivity of the CP to the
5Note that the utility of EUs connecting to ISP NoN is also decreasing with
tNoN (3)-I. However, the rate of decrease in the utility of EUs connecting to
ISP NoN (tNoN is multiplies to a coefficient smaller than one) is lower than
the rate of increase of the price of the neutral ISP (multiplied by one). Thus,
overall, the number of EUs with the neutral (respectively, non-neutral) ISP is
decreasing (respectively, increasing).
6quality. In candidate strategy (d), the Internet connection fee
of ISP NoN does not depends on the qualities, but it is as low
as the marginal cost.
Existence of NE: An SPNE may not always exist. For
example, for the parameters q˜f = 1, q˜p = 1.5, c = 1, κu = 1,
κad = 0.5, tN = 3, and tNoN = 2, none of the candidate
strategies listed above would be an SPNE. The reason is that
there exists a profitable deviation for at least one of the ISPs
for those candidate strategies that their conditions are satisfied
given these parameters. Later in Section V-A, we identify the
regions with no SPNE.
B. Benchmark: A Neutral Scenario
In the benchmark case, i.e. when both ISPs are neutral,
we proved that there exists a unique SPNE, and the unique
equilibrium outcome of the game is6:
• Stage 1 - Internet access Fees chosen by ISPs: peqN,B =
c+ 13 (2tNoN + tN ) and p
eq
NoN,B = c+
1
3 (2tN + tNoN ).• Stage 2 - Side Payment chosen by ISP NoN is of no
importance.
• Stage 3 - Qualities chosen by the CP: qeqNoN,B = q˜f and
qeqN,B = q˜f .
• Stage 4 - Fractions of EUs with ISPs: neqN,B =
2tNoN+tN
3(tNoN+tN )
and neqNoN,B =
2tN+tNoN
3(tNoN+tN )
.
Note that this case is similar to candidate strategy (e), i.e. the
only candidate strategy of our model by which zeq = 0. In this
case, both ISPs are active and the CP offers the free quality on
both ISPs. Note that in this case, the asymmetries of the model
only arise from the asymmetry in tN and tNoN . Thus, EUs
are divided between ISPs depending on tN and tNoN , and the
Internet access fees (pN and pNoN ) are a function of transport
costs (tN and tNoN ). Also, similar to the candidate strategy (b)
of the previous section, if tN (respectively, tNoN ) increases,
pNoN (respectively, pN ) increases with a rate 23 rd the rate
of the growth of this transport cost. In addition, counter-
intuitively, pN (respectively, pNoN ) also increases with a rate
1
3 rd of the rate of growth of tN (respectively, tNoN ).
Note that in this case, Internet access fees are independent
of the quality provided for EUs, i.e. q˜f . Recall that in contrast,
in a non-neutral regime, the Internet access fee quoted by
ISP NoN is dependent on the quality she provides (q˜p). The
reason for that is the product differentiation in the latter. The
non-neutral ISP can charge for the quality she provides for
EUs through differentiating her product from the neutral ISP.
While in a neutral regime, no ISP can charge for the quality
they provide because of competition. It is noteworthy that if
tNoN&tN → 0, peqNoN,B&peqN,B → c. In other words, in the
absence of inertias, since there is no differentiation between
the quality offered by the ISPs in the neutral regime, price
competition drives the access fees to the marginal cost. This
implies that by removing the inertias (tN and tNoN ), the
model would be similar to a Bertrand competition [3]. Thus,
considering the inertias brings a realistic dimension to the
model.
6The subscript B in the results refers to “Benchmark”.
Fig. 1: NE strategies of Stage 1 for various tN and tNoN when
κu = 1 and κad = 0.5
The relationship between neqN and n
eq
NoN and the transport
costs are similar to that of candidate strategies (b) and (c) of the
previous section, and is investigated with numerical examples
in Section V-A.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
First, in Section V-A, we find the NE strategies for the entire
range of transport costs, for various parameters, using numeri-
cal analysis. In Section V-B, we complement the discussions in
Section IV-A, by providing more intuitions about neqNoN , p˜
eq ,
and the payoff of ISPs, based on the numerical results. We
assess the benefits of non-neutrality by comparing the results
of the model with the benchmark case in Section V-C. In
Section V-D, we provide regulatory comments based on the
results.
A. NE Strategies
Recall that if SPNE exists, it would of the form of strategies
(a)-(e) (Section IV-A). Now, we check whether these strategies
are indeed SPNE. In order to do so, we check for any
profitable deviation for each of the ISPs. Note that to check
for unilateral deviations, we consider different regions of ∆p
(regions are characterized in Theorem 2-I). In each region, we
can identify the potential profitable deviations (using first order
condition for some regions, and the fact that payoff of ISPs
are monotonic in other regions). Thus, the search for the best
deviation for each ISP is equivalent to comparing the payoff
of finite number of candidate deviations with the payoff of
the candidate equilibrium. We also check additional conditions
listed in Theorems 6-I, 1, and 3.
We now present two illustrative examples. In Figure 1, we
identify the NE strategies of stage 1 for different regions of
tN and tNoN when κu = 1 and κad = 0.5. In Figure 2, we
identify the NE strategies when κu = 0.5 and κad = 1. In the
7Fig. 2: NE strategies of Stage 1 for various tN and tNoN when
κu = 0.5 and κad = 1
figures, we consider q˜f = 1, q˜p = 1.5, and c = 1. Numerical
results for a large set of parameters reveal that the pattern of
NE strategies for different values of parameters is similar to
one of the two pattern presented in Figures 1 and 2. Overall, the
outcome in which the neutral ISP is driven out of the market
occurs when tN and tNoN are sufficiently small. As tN and
tNoN increases, we expect to have equilibrium outcomes in
which both ISPs are active. Next, we discuss about the trends
we observe in the results.
Note that in Theorem 6-I, we proved that, for q˜p ≥
tN+2tNoN
κu+κad
and q˜p ≥ tN+tNoNκu , candidate strategy (Theorem 6-
I-1) is an NE. Numerical results for a large set of parameters
also reveal that for q˜p ≥ tN+2tNoNκu+κad and q˜p < tN+tNoNκu ,
candidate strategy (Theorem 1-1) is also an NE strategy.
Note that these two strategies are the same and are listed as
candidate strategy (a). Therefore, when tN+2tNoNκu+κad ≤ q˜p, (a)
is an NE strategy. Thus, the outcome in which the neutral
ISP is driven out of the market (candidate strategy (a)) occurs
when tN and tNoN are sufficiently small. In this case, since
the transport costs are low, EUs can easily switch ISPs. Thus,
ISP NoN is able to attract all EUs by using some of the side
payment fee she receives from the CP, and discounting the
Internet access fee for EUs.
With increase in tN or tNoN , EUs have more inertia. Thus,
one of the ISPs should provide a low Internet access fee for
EUs to attract them all. However, in this case, ISPs prefer to
maintain a high Internet access fee for EUs7, and split the EUs.
Thus, as tN and tNoN increases, we expect to have equilibrium
outcomes in which both ISPs are active. Numerical results
reveal that if q˜p < tN+2tNoNκu+κad and q˜p ≥ tN+tNoNκu , candidate
strategy (Theorem 6-I-2) is an NE. In addition, consider the
7As we discussed, when both ISPs are active, the Internet connection fees
are increasing with the transport costs. In other words, each ISP lock in some
EUs and charge high Internet access fees to them.
Fig. 3: neqNoN with respect to tN and tNoN
lines tN + 2tNoN = q˜p(κu + κad) and tN + tNoN = κuq˜p.
Results reveal that when the point (tN , tNoN ) is just above
these lines, the candidate strategy (Theorem 1-2) is an NE
strategy. When (tN , tNoN ) is substantially above these lines,
then Candidate strategy (Theorem 1-3) is an NE strategy. This
result have been proved in Theorem 2, i.e. when either of tN
and tNoN are high, then the unique NE outcome of the game
is (Theorem 1-3). In addition, when (tN , tNoN ) is above these
lines, but is in an intermediate range, then no NE exists.
Numerical results for large set of parameters also reveal that
the NE is unique, if it were to exist (in Figures there exists
only one NE in each region). In addition, extensive numerical
results reveal that candidate strategies (d) and (e) are never
SPNE. Thus, henceforth we do not include (d) and (e) in our
discussions about the results.
B. Dependencies of neqNoN , p˜
eq , and Payoffs of ISPs to tN and
tNoN
In this section, using numerical results, we discuss about
the dependencies of neqNoN , p˜
eq , and Payoffs of ISPs to tN
and tNoN . Note that in Section IV-A, we explained that the
relationship between neqNoN and the transport costs is not
obvious from the expressions. Thus, in this section, we provide
intuitions for the behavior of neqNoN , and subsequently p˜
eq and
the payoffs of ISPs with respect to tN and tNoN .
Numerical Results on neqNoN : Numerical results reveal that
neqNoN is non-increasing with respect to both transport costs.
For instance, in Figure 3, we plot the value of neqNoN with
respect to tNoN and tN , when q˜f = 1 and q˜p = 1.5.8
Note that for candidate strategy (a), as we know from the
results, neqNoN = 1. To understand the results for candidate
strategies (b) and (c), note that from (5)-I the number of EUs
with each ISP has a decreasing relation with (i) the transport
costs of the ISP, and (ii) the Internet access fee of the ISP
which itself is increasing with both transport costs. In addition,
the number of EUs with the ISP has an increasing relation with
respect to the same parameters for the other ISP. Thus, different
factors, some decreasing and some increasing with respect to
the transport cost of an ISP, play a role in determining the
number of EUs with each ISP. Overall, it turns out that the
effect of increasing either of the transport costs decreases the
incentive of EUs to join ISP NoN. Thus, in candidate strategies
8Recall that neqN = 1− neqNoN . Thus, we only plot neqNoN .
8Fig. 4: p˜eq with respect to tN and tNoN
Fig. 5: Payoff of ISPs with respect to tN and tNoN
(b) and (c), neqNoN is decreasing with respect to both transport
costs.
Numerical Results on p˜eq: Note that the higher the number
of EUs with ISP NoN, the higher would be the benefit of
the CP from the premium quality. Thus, we expect the side-
payment, i.e. p˜eq to be increasing with respect to number of
EUs with ISP NoN. Results in Section IV-A also confirms
this fact. Thus, the relationship between p˜eq and the transport
costs is similar to the relationship between neqNoN and the
transport costs. Therefore, in candidate strategy (b) and (c),
the higher one of the transport costs, the lower would be the
side payments. For instance, in Figures 4, we plot the value of
p˜eq with respect to tNoN and tN , respectively, when q˜f = 1
and q˜p = 1.5.
Note that as we discussed in Section IV-A, in candidate strat-
egy (b), p˜eq can be positive or negative. However, numerical
results for a large set of parameters reveal that p˜eq is positive,
whenever this candidate strategy is NE.
Numerical Results on the Payoffs of ISPs: Numerical
results for the case q˜f = 1 and q˜p = 1.5 are plotted in Figure
5. If there is no NE strategy, we plot the payoff of ISPs in the
benchmark case, i.e. when both ISPs are neutral.
Note that when the market of power ISP NoN is small, i.e.
the fraction tNtN+tNoN is small, then the payoff of ISP NoN
would be lower than the payoff of ISP N (Figure 5-left).
For candidate strategy (a), the payoff of ISP N is zero (since
the number of EUs with this ISP is zero), and the payoff of
ISP NoN is independent of tN (since ISP N is out of the
market), but decreasing with respect to tNoN (since p
eq
NoN is
decreasing with tNoN ). Intuitively, we expect the utility of
an ISP to be decreasing with respect to the transport cost of
that ISP, and increasing with respect to the transport cost of
the other ISP. However, for some parameters and some of the
candidate strategies, results reveal that the payoff of an ISP is
increasing with the transport cost of the ISP. Next, we explain
the underlying reasons for this counter-intuitive behavior.
Note that the payoff of an ISP is increasing with (i) the
number of EUs with the ISP and also (ii) the Internet access
fee charged to the EUs. Recall that for the neutral ISP, in
candidate strategies (b), (c), and the benchmark case, both of
(i) and (ii) are increasing with respect to both transport costs.
Thus, the payoff of ISP N is increasing with respect to both
transport costs. On the other hand, for ISP NoN, the number
of EUs is decreasing and the Internet access fee is increasing
with the transport costs. Thus, depending on which of these
factors overweights the other one, the payoff of ISP NoN can
be decreasing or increasing with respect to the transport costs.
C. Profits of Entities Due to Non-neutrality
We compare the results of the model and the benchmark case
in which both ISPs are neutral. We compare Internet access
fees, payoff of ISPs, the welfare of EUs, and the payoff of the
CP in Sections V-C1, V-C2, V-C3, and V-C4, respectively.
1) Internet Access Fees: In a non-neutral case, the neutral
ISP would always decrease her Internet access fee, while the
Internet access fee of the non-neutral ISP could be higher or
lower depending on the parameters of the market. We now
provide insights on when each of these scenarios happens.
First, note that the discount that ISP N provides for EUs
in a non-neutral case, i.e. peqN,B − peqN , is always positive for
candidate strategies (a), (b), and (c) (using previous results).
Thus, the neutral ISP would always decrease her Internet
access fee in a non-neutral scenario in order to compete with
the non-neutral ISP which is now offering a better quality.
In a non-neutral regime, if (a) occurs, then the discount that
ISP NoN provides for EUs in a non-neutral case is peqNoN,B −
peqNoN =
1
3 (5tNoN + tN )− κuq˜p (using the previous results).
This discount can be negative or positive, and is decreasing
with κu and q˜p, and increasing with tNoN and tN . Thus, if
(i) EUs are not sensitive to the quality, i.e. small κu, (ii) ISP
NoN does not provide a high premium quality, i.e. small q˜p,
(iii) end-users cannot switch between ISPs easily, i.e. tN and
tNoN large enough, or a combination of these factors, then
ISP NoN provides a cheaper Internet access fee for EUs in
comparison to the neutral scenario.
For candidate strategies (b) (respectively, (c)), using the
results in Sections IV-A and IV-B, the amount of discount
is peqNoN,B−peqNoN = 13 q˜p(2κad−κu) (respectively, peqNoN,B−
peqNoN =
1
3 (q˜p − q˜f )(2κad − κu)). Thus, if 2κad > κu, i.e.
the sensitivity of the CP is high enough, then the discount is
positive and is increasing with the premium quality (respec-
tively, the difference between the premium and free quality).
On the other hand, if the sensitivity of the CP is low, then the
discount is negative, i.e. ISP NoN charges higher access fees
to the EUs. The reason is that if the CP is sensitive to the
quality, ISP NoN can charge higher side-payments to the CP.
Thus, she can provide some of these new revenue to EUs as a
discount even though they receive a premium quality. This is
not possible when the CP is not sensitive to the quality of her
content. In this case, ISP NoN charges the premium quality to
the EUs directly, i.e. higher Internet access fees for EUs.
92) Payoff of ISPs: Consider the payoffs of the neutral and
non-neutral ISPs under both neutral and non-neutral scenarios.
The difference in the payoffs for the case κu = 0.5, κad = 1,
q˜f = 1, q˜p = 1.5, and tN = 0.3 are plotted in Figure 6.9
Results reveal that the neutral ISP will lose payoff in all
of the non-neutral NE strategies, i.e. those that yield zeq = 1
(Figure 6-right). Note that in case (a), ISP N would be driven
out of the market. Thus, pieqN = 0, while pi
eq
N,B > 0. In cases
(b) and (c), although ISP N is active, she has to subsidize the
Internet connection fee for EUs to be able to compete with ISP
NoN, while possibly can attract lower number of EUs. This
yields a loss in the payoff under a non-neutral scenario.
Results also reveal that for a wide range of parameters,
ISP NoN receives a better payoff under a non-neutral sce-
nario (Figure 6-left). We discussed that ISP NoN extracts the
additional profit of the CP (from the premium quality her
EUs receive) in a non-neutral scenario. In addition, we also
explained that for some parameters (κu > 2κad), ISP NoN
charges higher prices to EUs. Even when ISP NoN subsidizes
the Internet access fee for EUs (2κad > κad), she would
compensate through the side payment charged to the CP (high
κad yields a high side payment). Moreover, ISP NoN can
potentially attract more EUs by providing a cheaper fee or
a premium quality (or both). Thus, overall we expect the non-
neutral ISP to receives a better payoff under a non-neutral
regime.
However, we can find scenarios in which the non-neutral
ISP loses payoff by switching to non-neutrality. For example,
with κu = κad = 0.85, q˜f = 1, q˜p = 1.03, tN = 0.05, and
tNoN = 0.8, then pi
eq
NoN < pi
eq
NoN,B . In particular, the payoff
of ISP NoN decreases in a non-neutral regime if the outcome
of the market is (a), and κu, κad, q˜p − q˜f , and tNtN+tNoN (the
market power of ISP NoN) are small.
We now explain the underlying reason for this counter-
intuitive result. Note that knowing that the other ISP has
switched to non-neutrality, the neutral ISP would decrease her
Internet access fee for EUs to compensate for the superior
quality that her competitor offers. On the other hand, the
non-neutral ISP also has to significantly decrease her Internet
access fee for EUs (because of her low market power, com-
petition, and low sensitivity of EUs to the quality), while not
generating enough revenue from the side-payments received
from the CP (because of low sensitivity of the CP to quality
or a premium quality that is not significantly better than a free
quality)10. This makes both ISPs, lose revenue in a non-neutral
setting under the specified conditions.
3) EU’s Welfare: Recall that from (3)-I, the utility of an
EU who connects to the ISP j ∈ {N,NoN} located at distance
xj of the ISP, and is receiving the content with quality qj , is
uEU,j = v
∗+κuqj−tjxj−pj . Now, let us define the Welfare of
EUs (EUW) for an EU connected to ISP j located at distance
xj from this ISP to be uEU,j(xj)−v∗ = κuqj−pj−tjxj . Note
that we dropped the common valuation v∗ since it is equal for
all EUs in all scenarios, and is only used to guarantee the full
9Using different parameters values yields the same intuitions.
10Note that the non-neutral ISP still extracts the additional profit she creates
for EUs.
Fig. 6: The difference between the payoff of ISPs for two
scenarios with respect to tN and tNoN
Fig. 7: EUW with respect to tN and tNoN
coverage of the market, i.e. to prevent negative utility for EUs.
Thus, the total welfare of EUs is:
EUW =
∫ nN
0
(
κuqN − pN − tNx
)
dx
+
∫ 1
nN
(
κuqNoN − pNoN − tNoN (1− x)
)
dx
= (κuqN − pN )nN − tN
2
n2N + (κuqNoN − pNoN )nNoN
− tNoN
2
n2NoN
(3)
Note that since we dropped v∗, EUW could be negative. In
Figures 7 and 8, we plot the difference in the EUW of the non-
neutral case with the benchmark case for various parameters
of the market, when q˜f = 1 and q˜p = 1.5.
Results reveal that in general, EUW would be higher in a
non-neutral setting if (i) the market power of ISP NoN is low,
(ii) the sensitivity of the CP to the quality is high, or (iii) EUs
are not very sensitive to the quality, or a combination of these
conditions. However, when both transport costs are sufficiently
small, or the sensitivity of EUs (respectively, the CP) to the
Fig. 8: EUW with respect to tN and tNoN
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quality is high (respectively, low), then the benchmark case
yields a better EUW in comparison to the non-neutral case.
We next explain the reasons behind these results.
Consider the benchmark case. In this case, the welfare of
EUs is dependent on the transport costs and the Internet access
fees determined by ISPs N and NoN. Recall that both access
fees are increasing with tN and tNoN . Thus, intuitively, EUW
of the benchmark case is decreasing with tN and tNoN .11
In case (a), in which only the non-neutral ISP is active,
EUW is dependent on the Internet access fee of ISP NoN, i.e.
peqNoN = c + κuq˜p − tNoN . Thus, EUW of the non-neutral
scenario with outcome (a) is increasing with respect to tNoN .
In other words, if tNoN is large, ISP NoN should provide
a cheaper Internet access fee (subsidizing the access fee), to
attract EUs and keep the neutral ISP out of the market. Thus,
EUW would be high. In addition, the EUW is independent of
tN . Thus, as Figures 7 and 8 confirm , the difference between
the EUW of the non-neutral scenario in case (a) and the EUW
of the benchmark case is increasing with respect to tN and
tNoN .
We observe that when both transport costs are sufficiently
small, the benchmark case yields a higher payoff than the non-
neutral scenario. Note that if tNoN is small, i.e. EUs can join
(switch to) ISP NoN without incurring high transport costs, ISP
NoN attracts all EUs even when quoting a high Internet access
fee for EUs (since it offers a premium quality). Thus, ISP NoN
charges a high Internet access fee, and the EUW would be
small. On the other hand, if tN is also small, the EUW of the
benchmark case would be high (as discussed previously). Thus,
when both transport costs are sufficiently small, we expect
the benchmark case to yield a better EUW in comparison to
the non-neutral case. Negative differences in Figures 7 and 8
confirm this intuition. Note that in Figure 8, because of high
sensitivity of EUs to the quality, EUW of the neutral scenario
is higher than the non-neutral scenario even when tN or tNoN
are not small. Finally, observe that the maximum difference in
the EUWs is achieved for the highest tN and tNoN by which
the outcome of the game is (a), i.e. when only the non-neutral
is active.
For candidate strategies (b) and (c), similar to the benchmark
case, the Internet access fees are increasing with respect to
tN and tNoN . Thus, EUW is expected to be decreasing with
respect to these transport costs. Results in the figures reveal
that the difference in EUWs is decreasing with respect to
tNoN and tN .12 This means that EUW of the non-neutral
case decreases more than EUW of the benchmark case. This
difference is positive when the sensitivity of the EUs to the
quality is low, i.e. small κu (Figure 7), and negative when κu
is large (Figure 8). Recall that the non-neutral ISP provides
discount to EUs when the sensitivity of the CP to the quality
is high enough. If not, ISP NoN charges higher prices to EUs
in comparison to the benchmark case. This is the reason that
EUW of the non-neutral case is lower than the benchmark case
when EUs are highly sensitive to the quality they receive.
11Note that nN and nNoN are sum up to one. Thus, the effect of access
fees on EUW is more than the effect of number of EUs with each ISP.
12From figures, it seems that the difference in (c) is constant. However, a
closer look on the results reveals a slow decreasing behaviour.
Thus, the transport costs and the sensitivity of EUs and the
CP to the quality are the important factors in comparing the
EUW of the neutral and non-neutral scenario. Note that (as
explained) the higher the sensitivity of the CP (respectively,
EUs) to the quality, the higher (respectively, lower) would be
EUW in the non-neutral case.
4) Payoff of the CP: Using (2)-I, the candidate strategies
and their outcomes listed in Section IV-A, and the outcome
of the benchmark case in Section IV-B, we can calculate the
payoff of the CP in different outcomes. Results yield that the
equilibrium payoff of the CP in all of the possible outcomes
of the non-neutral scenario and also in the benchmark scenario
are equal and are pieqCP = pi
eq
CP,B = κadq˜f . The reason is that
the non-neutral ISP is the leader in the this leader-follower
game. Thus, knowing the parameters of the game and the tie-
breaking assumption 2 of the CP, it can extract all the profits of
the CP and make it indifferent between taking the non-neutral
option and not taking it.
D. Does the Market Need to be Regulated?
We showed that in the presence of a “big” monopolistic
CP and when EUs can switch between ISPs, if a non-neutral
regime emerges, then neutral ISPs are likely to lose their
market share, and are expected to be forced out of the market.
In addition, in any NE outcome, the neutral ISP would lose
payoff. Thus, if, the regulator is interested in keeping some of
the neutral ISPs in the market13, she should provide incentives
for them. These incentives could be in the form of monetary
subsidies or tax deductions.
Although for many parameters, the payoff of the non-neutral
ISP would be higher by adopting a non-neutral regime, as
explained before, with certain conditions on the parameters,
an ISP is likely to receive a lower payoff by switching to
non-neutral regime. These conditions are when (i) EUs are not
sensitive to the quality, i.e. small κu, (ii) the CP is not sensitive
to the quality her EUs receive, i.e. small κad, (iii) ISP NoN
does not offer enough differentiation in the quality, i.e. small
q˜p− q˜f , (iv) the market power of the non-neutral ISP is low, or
a combination of these factors. Thus, with these conditions a
non-neutral regime is unlikely to emerge, and there is no need
for a government intervention.
VI. DISCUSSIONS ON GENERALIZATION OF THE MODEL
Note that we assumed qN ∈ {0, q˜f} and qNoN ∈ {0, q˜f , q˜p}.
This assumption can be generalized to selecting quality strate-
gies from continuous sets, i.e. qN ∈ [0, q˜f ] and qNoN ∈ [0, q˜p].
In this case, the CP pays a side payment of p˜qNoN if she
chooses qNoN ∈ (q˜f , q˜p]. In Appendix E, we prove that our
results herein would continue to hold under this generalization.
The result that over some parameters, an ISP can lose payoff
by switching to a non-neutral regime is dependent on the
assumption that the neutral and non-neutral ISPs first decide on
the Internet access fees, and then the non-neutral ISP decides
13For example, the reason could be to prevent non-neutral ISPs from
becoming monopoly or it could be the social pressure to preserve some
neutrality in the market.
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on the side-payment in the second stage. If we swap the order
of these two stages, then the non-neutral ISP would not lose
payoff by switching to non-neutrality since in this case, she
is the leader of the game. Thus, ISP NoN, in the worst case,
obtains the payoff of the neutral scenario. Recall that the reason
for our choice of the orders of the stages of the game is that
Internet access fees are expected to be kept constant for a
longer time horizons in comparison to the side-payment.
Recall that in the hotelling model, we considered EUs to be
distributed uniformly between zero and one. We now provide
insights on a generalization of the uniform distribution to a
non-uniform one. In that case, depending on the skewness of
the probability measure, results would be similar to small tN
or tNoN . For example, if the probability measure is skewed
toward zero, i.e. EUs are distributed close to the neutral ISP,
results would be similar to uniform distribution and tN small.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1 AND COROLLARY 1
First, we prove Theorem 1. Then, using the results of this
theorem, we prove Corollary 1.
Proof: In this case, note that q˜f < q˜p < tN+tNoNκu . Thus,
we characterize the optimum strategies for the CP using items
1, 2, and 4 of Theorem 2-I.
First, note that by Lemma 5-I, since q˜p < tN+tNoNκu , κuq˜p−
tNoN < ∆pt < tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ), where ∆pt = κu(2q˜p −
q˜f )−tNoN characterized in Lemma 1-I. Thus, using this result,
we characterize the regions characterized in items 1, 2, and 4
of Theorem 2-I. We denote ∆p ≤ κuq˜p − tNoN by region
A, κuq˜p − tNoN < ∆p < κu(2q˜p − q˜f ) − tNoN by region
B1, κu(2q˜p − q˜f ) − tNoN ≤ ∆p < tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ) by
region C, tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ) ≤ ∆p < tN + κuq˜p by set B2,
and ∆p ≥ tN + κuq˜p by D. Using Theorem 2-I, if zeq = 1,
then ∆p < tN +κuq˜p. Thus, we characterize any possible NE
strategies by which zeq = 1, in regions A and B1, C, and B2:
Case A: First, we consider ∆p ≤ κuq˜p−tNoN . In this case,
we show that the payoff of ISP NoN is an increasing function
of ∆p. Then, we characterize the NE as peqNoN = c+ κuq˜p −
tNoN and p
eq
N = c, using the fact that when choosing an NE,
no player can increase her payoff by unilaterally changing her
strategy.
Note that by Theorem 2-I, for region A, (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) =
(0, q˜p) ∈ FL1 if and only if p˜ ≤ p˜t,1 = κad(1− q˜fq˜p ). In addition,
by Theorem 4-I, if zeq = 1 then p˜eq = p˜t,1 = κad(1 − q˜fq˜p )
(Definition 3-I). Thus, in this region, if zeq = 1, the payoff
of ISP NoN is equal to pNoN − c + q˜pp˜t,1 (by (1)-I) since
nNoN = 1. Therefore, the payoff is an increasing function
of pNoN . In addition, note that in region A, nN = 0 and
regardless of pN , the neutral ISP receives a payoff of zero (by
(1)-I). Thus, peqNoN , i.e. the equilibrium Internet access fee,
should be such that the neutral ISP cannot get a positive payoff
by increasing or decreasing pN , and changing the region of ∆p
to B1, B2, or C. Using this condition, we find the equilibrium
strategy.
First consider a unilateral deviation by ISP N. Note that
increasing pN decreases ∆p, and cannot change the region of
∆p.14 Thus, a deviation of this kind would not be profitable.
We claim that by decreasing pN to p′N such that pNoN−p′N >
κuq˜p− tNoN , the ISP N can fetch a positive payoff as long as
p′N > c (the claim is proved in the next paragraph). Therefore,
in the equilibrium, peqNoN is such that even with p
′
N = c (the
minimum plausible price), ∆p ≤ κuq˜p−tNoN . Thus, peqNoN ≤
c + κuq˜p − tNoN .15 Given that the payoff of ISP NoN is an
increasing function of pNoN , we get p
eq
NoN = c+κuq˜p−tNoN .
In addition, we claim that peqN = c. If not, then p
eq
N > c. In this
case, ∆p = peqN − peqNoN < κuq˜p − tNoN . We argued that the
payoff of ISP NoN is an increasing function of pNoN . Thus,
by increasing pNoN such that ∆p = κuq˜p − tNoN , ISP NoN
can increase her payoff, which is a contradiction with peqN and
peqNoN being NE strategies.
To prove the claim, note that if pNoN −p′N > κuq˜p− tNoN ,
then either (i) zeq = 0 or (ii) zeq = 1. For case (i), since
κuq˜p − tNoN > −tNoN , when ∆p > κuq˜p − tNoN , then
(qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) is of the form of items 1 or 2 of Theorem 1-I.
Thus, nN > 0. Therefore ISP N can fetch a positive payoff as
long as pN > c (by (1)-I). Now consider case (ii), i.e. zeq = 1.
In this case, if zeq = 1, then by using item 2 of Thoerem 2-I,
nN > 0 (since solutions that yield zeq = 1 are in F I .). Thus,
ISP N can fetch a positive payoff as long as pN > c (by (1)-I).
This completes the proof of the claim that by decreasing pN
to p′N such that pNoN − p′N > κuq˜p − tNoN , the ISP N can
fetch a positive payoff as long as p′N > c.
Therefore, the NE strategies are peqNoN = c+ κuq˜p − tNoN
and peqN = c, and the payoff of the ISP NoN at this price by
(1)-I and p˜t,1 = κad(1− q˜fq˜p ) is equal to (note that nNoN = 1),
and
pieqNoN = κuq˜p− tNoN + q˜pp˜t,1 = κuq˜p− tNoN +κad(q˜p− q˜f )
(4)
which is strictly positive since q˜p > tN+tNoNκu and q˜p > q˜f .
Note that Lemma 6-I yields that with peqN and p
eq
NoN , z
eq = 1.
The first item of the theorem follows.
Case B1 and B2: Now, consider regions B1 and B2, i.e.
κuq˜p− tNoN < ∆p < κu(2q˜p− q˜f )− tNoN and tN +κu(q˜p−
q˜f ) ≤ ∆p < tN + κuq˜p, respectively.
Note that in these regions, by items 2-a-ii and 2-b of
Theorem 2-I, if zeq = 1, then (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (0, q˜p) ∈ F I1 .
In addition, by Theorem 4-I, p˜eq = p˜t,2 = κad(nNoN − q˜fq˜p )
and nNoN =
tN+κuq˜p−∆p
tN+tNoN
(Definition 3-I). Thus, by (1)-I, the
payoff of ISP NoN in this region is piNoN,B(pNoN , p˜t,2) =
(pNoN − c)nNoN + p˜t,2q˜p, and the payoff of ISP N is piN,B =
(pN − c)(1− nNoN ). Note that p˜t,2q˜p = κad(q˜pnNoN − q˜f ).
Thus, using the expression of nNoN , the payoffs are:
14Recall that in this region, nN = 0, and ISP N fetch a payoff of zero.
15Otherwise, there exists a p′N > c by which ∆p > κuq˜p − tNoN .
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piNoN,B(pNoN , p˜t,2) = (pNoN − c+ κadq˜p)(
tN + κuq˜p + pN − pNoN
tN + tNoN
)
− κadq˜f
(5)
piN,B(pN ) = (pN − c)( tNoN − κuq˜p + pNoN − pN
tN + tNoN
) (6)
First, we rule out any NE such that ∆peq = tN+κu(q˜p−q˜f ).
Suppose that ∆peq = peqNoN−peqN = tN+κu(q˜p−q˜f ). Consider
a deviation by ISP N such that p′N = p
eq
N + > c for  > 0 such
that ∆p′ = peqNoN −p′N to be in region C. Note that by item 2-
a-i of Theorem 2-I, in region C, (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (q˜f , q˜p) ∈ F I1 .
Thus, the payoff of this ISP with this deviation is (by (1)):
piN (p
′
N ) = (p
eq
N+−c)(
tNoN − κu(q˜p − q˜f ) + peqNoN − peqN − 
tN + tNoN
)
Note that lim↓0 piN (p′N ) > piN,B(p
eq
N ). Thus, for  > 0
small enough, this deviation is profitable. Thus, the strategies
by which ∆peq = tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ) cannot be NE.
Now, we characterize any NE in κuq˜p − tNoN < ∆p <
κu(2q˜p− q˜f )−tNoN and tN+κu(q˜p− q˜f ) < ∆p < tN+κuq˜p.
Note that any NE inside this region should satisfy the first order
optimality condition (note that the payoffs are concave). Thus,
dpiN
dpN
= 0⇒ tNoN − κuq˜p + pNoN − 2pN + c = 0
dpiNoN,B
dpNoN
= 0⇒ tN + q˜p(κu − κad) + pN − 2pNoN + c = 0
(7)
Solving the equation yields:
peqNoN = c+
tNoN + 2tN + q˜p(κu − 2κad)
3
(8)
peqN = c+
2tNoN + tN − q˜p(κu + κad)
3
(9)
First, note that if q˜p > 2tNoN+tNκu+κad , then p
eq
N < c, and
peqN cannot be an NE. Thus, the first necessary condition for
these strategies to be NE is q˜p ≤ 2tNoN+tNκu+κad . In addition,
by Theorem 3-I,16 pieqNoN > piNoN,z=0(p˜
eq
NoN , p˜) (for these
strategies to yield zeq = 1). The second item of the theorem
follows.
Case C: Now, consider region C, i.e. ∆pt = κu(2q˜p −
q˜f ) − tNoN ≤ ∆p < tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ). Note that in this
regions, by items 2-a-i of Theorem 2-I, if zeq = 1, then
(qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (q˜f , q˜p) ∈ F I1 . In addition, by Theorem 4-
I and Definition 4-I, p˜eq = p˜t,3 = κadnNoN (1 − q˜fq˜p ) and
nNoN =
tN+κu(q˜p−q˜f )−∆p
tN+tNoN
(Definition 3-I). Thus, by (1)-I,
the payoff of ISP NoN in this region is piNoN,C(pNoN , p˜t,3) =
(pNoN − c)nNoN + p˜t,3q˜p, and the payoff of ISP N is piN,B =
(pN − c)(1− nNoN ). Note that p˜t,3q˜p = κadnNoN (q˜p − q˜f ).
Thus, using the expression of nNoN , the payoffs are:
16Note that in Regions B1 and B2, ∆p < tN + κuq˜p.
piNoN,C(pNoN , p˜t,3) =
(pNoN − c+ κad(q˜p − q˜f ))(
tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ) + pN − pNoN
tN + tNoN
)
(10)
piN,C(pN ) = (pN − c)(
tNoN − κu(q˜p − q˜f ) + pNoN − pN
tN + tNoN
) (11)
First, in Part C-1, we characterize any NE in region κu(2q˜p−
q˜f )− tNoN < ∆p < tN + κu(q˜p− q˜f ). Later, in Part C-2, we
consider the case that ∆peq = κu(2q˜p − q˜f )− tNoN .
Part C-1: Note that any NE in region κu(2q˜p−q˜f )−tNoN <
∆p < tN+κu(q˜p− q˜f ) should satisfy the first order optimality
condition (note that the payoffs are concave). Thus,
dpiN,C
dpN
= 0⇒ tNoN − κu(q˜p − q˜f ) + pNoN − 2pN + c = 0
dpiNoN,C
dpNoN
= 0⇒ tN + (q˜p − q˜f )(κu − κad) + pN − 2pNoN + c = 0
(12)
Solving the equation yields:
peqNoN = c+
tNoN + 2tN + (q˜p − q˜f )(κu − 2κad)
3
(13)
peqN = c+
2tNoN + tN − (q˜p − q˜f )(κu + κad)
3
(14)
First, note that if q˜p−q˜f > 2tNoN+tNκu+κad , then p
eq
N < c, and p
eq
N
cannot be an NE. Thus, the first necessary condition for these
strategies to be NE is q˜p − q˜f ≤ 2tNoN+tNκu+κad . In addition, by
Theorem 3-I, pieqNoN > piNoN,z=0(p˜
eq
NoN , p˜) (in order for these
strategies to yield zeq = 1). The third item of the theorem
follows.
Part C-2: Now, consider peqN and p
eq
NoN such that ∆p
eq =
peqNoN − peqN = κu(2q˜p − q˜f )− tNoN . These strategies are not
NE if ISP NoN can strictly increase her payoff by decreasing
her price such that ∆p in region B1. Note that using (10) and
the expression for ∆peq , the payoff of ISP NoN in this case
is:
piNoN (p
eq
NoN , p˜t,3) = (pNoN−c+κad(q˜p−q˜f ))(
tN − κuq˜p + tNoN
tN + tNoN
)
(15)
By choosing p′NoN = p
eq
NoN −  such that  ↓ 0, ISP NoN
can get a limit payoff of (since ∆p = ∆peq when → 0, and
it is in region B1, and using (5)):
pi′NoN = lim
↓0
pieqNoN (pNoN − , p˜t,3)
= (peqNoN − c+ κadq˜p)(
tN − κu(q˜p − q˜f ) + tNoN
tN + tNoN
)− κadq˜f
Thus, peqN and p
eq
NoN such that ∆p
eq = peqNoN − peqN =
κu(2q˜p − q˜f )− tNoN are not NE if:
pi′NoN > piNoN (p
eq
NoN , p˜t,3)
⇐⇒ (peqNoN − c+ κadq˜p)
κuq˜f
tN + tNoN
− κadκuq˜f q˜p
tN + tNoN
> 0
⇐⇒ peqNoN > c
Thus, the necessary condition for these strategy to be NE
is peqNoN ≤ c. Note that from (10) and (11), since ∆p
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is fixed, the payoffs of ISP NoN and N are an increasing
function of pNoN and pN , respectively. Thus, p
eq
NoN = c,
and peqN = c − κu(2q˜p − q˜f ) + tNoN . Note that a necessary
condition for peqN to be an NE is that p
eq
N ≥ c. Thus, one
necessary condition is that 2q˜p − q˜f ≤ tNoNκu . In addition,
piNoN (p˜
eq
NoN , p˜t,3) > piNoN,z=0(p˜
eq
NoN , p˜) (using Theorem 3-I,
in order for these strategies to yield zeq = 1). The forth item
of the theorem follows.
We now prove Corollary 1:
Proof: First, consider Strategy 1 of Theorem 1. Item 1 of
Theorem 2-I yields that (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (0, q˜p) ∈ FL1 . Thus,
neqN = 0, and n
eq
NoN = 1. In addition, by Theorem 4-I, p˜
eq =
p˜t,1 = κad(1− q˜fq˜p ).
Now, consider Strategy 2 of Theorem 1. Note that we
constructed this strategy such that ∆p satisfies items 2-a-ii
or 2-b of Theorem 2-I. Thus, (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (0, q˜p) ∈ F I1 .
In addition, by Theorem 4-I, p˜eq = p˜t,2 = κad(n
eq
NoN − q˜fq˜p ).
Using the expression for ∆p = peqNoN − peqN , and (5)-I, the
expressions for neqN and n
eq
NoN follow.
Consider Strategies 3 and 4 of Theorem 1. In this case, ∆p
satisfies item 2-a-i of Theorem 2-I (by construction of these
strategies). Thus, (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (q˜f , q˜p) ∈ F I1 . In addition,
by Theorem 4-I, p˜eq = p˜t,3 = κadn
eq
NoN (1 − q˜fq˜p ). Using the
expression of ∆peq for each of the strategies, neqN and n
eq
NoN
follow.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: We use Theorem 1 to prove the result. First, in
Part 1, we prove that when one of tN or tNoN is large, then
strategies 1), 2), and 4) listed in Theorem 1 are not NE. In
Part 2, we prove that when one of tN or tNoN is high, then
strategy 3) of Theorem 1 is an NE. This completes the proof
of the theorem.
Part 1: We prove that strategies 1), 2), and 4) listed in
Theorem 1 are not NE in Parts 1-i, 1-ii, and 1-iii, respectively.
Part 1-i: In this part, we prove that, item 1 of Theorem 1,
i.e. peqNoN = c+κuq˜p−tNoN and peqN = c is not an NE. We do
so in Parts 1-i-a and 1-i-b, by introducing a unilateral profitable
deviation for ISP NoN for the cases that tNoN is large and
tN is large, respectively. Note that in this case, by item 1 of
Theorem 2-I, (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) ∈ (0, q˜f ) ∈ FL1 . Thus, nNoN = 1,
and the payoff of ISP NoN is (by (1)-I, Theorem 4-I, and
Definition 3-I):
piNoN = κuq˜p − tNoN + κad(q˜p − q˜f ) (16)
Part 1-i-a: If tNoN is large, then (16) would be less than zero.
A deviation to price p′NoN = c yields a payoff of at least zero
for the ISP NoN (by (1)-I). Thus, this is a profitable deviation.
Part 1-i-b: Now, consider tN to be large, and a deviation by
ISP NoN such that p′NoN =
1
2 tN (Thus, ∆p = p
′
NoN − peqN =
1
2 tN−c). Note that in this case, ∆pt = κu(2q˜p− q˜f )−tNoN <
∆p < tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ). Thus, by item 2-a-i of Theorem 2-I,
(qeqn , q
eq
NoN ) = (q˜f , q˜p) ∈ F I1 . Thus, by (1)-I, the payoff of
ISP NoN after deviation is at least17 (by the definition of p˜t,3
in Definition 3-I and Theorem 4-I):
pi′NoN =
1
2
tNnNoN + κadnNoN (q˜p − q˜f ) (17)
, where nNoN =
1
2 tN+κu(q˜p−q˜f )+c
tN+tNoN
. Thus, for tN large,
nNoN → 12 . Thus, comparing (17) with (16) yields:
pi′NoN =
1
4
tN +
1
2
κad(q˜p− q˜f ) > piNoN since tN is large
Thus, this deviation is profitable .
Part 1-ii: In this part, we prove that item 2 of Theorem 1,
i.e. peqNoN = c +
tNoN+2tN+q˜p(κu−2κad)
3 and p
eq
N = c +
2tNoN+tN−q˜p(κu+κad)
3 is not an NE. We do so by proving that
∆peq does not satisfy κuq˜p− tNoN < ∆peq < κu(2q˜p− q˜f )−
tNoN and tN +κu(q˜p− q˜f ) < ∆peq < tN +κuq˜p, in the cases
that tNoN or tN is large.
First, note that:
∆peq = peqNoN − peqN =
1
3
(tN − tNoN + q˜p(2κu− κad)) (18)
If ∆peq < κu(2q˜p−q˜f )−tNoN , then tN+2tNoN < 3κu(2q˜p−
q˜f ) − q˜p(2κu − κad), which is not correct when tNoN or tN
is large. Thus, (a) ∆peq ≥ κu(2q˜p − q˜f )− tNoN . In addition,
if tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ) < ∆peq , then 2tN + tNoN < q˜p(2κu −
κad) − 3κu(q˜p − q˜f ), which is not correct when tNoN or tN
is large. Thus, (b) ∆peq ≤ tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ). Therefore, (a)
and (b) yields that ∆peq is not in the regions specified. Thus,
item 2 cannot be an NE.
Part 1-iii: In this part, we prove that item 4 of Theorem 1,
i.e. peqNoN = c and p
eq
N = c − κu(2q˜p − q˜f ) + tNoN is not an
NE. To do so, we prove that there exists a profitable unilateral
deviation for ISP NoN. Note that, in this case, ∆peq = ∆pt.
By item 2-a-i of Theorem 2-I, when ∆pt ≤ ∆p < tN+κu(q˜p−
q˜f ), then (q
eq
N , q
eq
NoN ) = (q˜f , q˜p) ∈ F I1 . Thus, the expression
of the payoff of ISP NoN is (by p˜t = p˜t,3, Definition 3-I,
Theorem 4-I, and (9)-I):
piNoN,C(pNoN , p˜t,3)
= (pNoN − c+ κad(q˜p − q˜f ))(
tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ) + pN − pNoN
tN + tNoN
)
Note that:
dpiNoN,C
dpNoN
=
tN + (q˜p − q˜f )(κu − κad) + pN − 2pNoN + c
tN + tNoN
Thus,
dpiNoN,C
dpNoN
|peq
N
,p
eq
NoN
=
tN + tNoN + (q˜p − q˜f )(κu − κad)− κu(2q˜p − q˜f )
tN + tNoN
Note that dpiNoN,CdpNoN |peqN ,peqNoN > 0, when either tN or tNoN are
large enough. Thus, in this case, the payoff is increasing with
17Note that the payoff of NoN is equal to the maximum of the payoff when
p˜eq = p˜t and when p˜eq > p˜t, i.e. when zeq = 0.
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respect to pNoN 18. Thus, p′NoN = p
eq
NoN +  for  > 0 small,
is a unilateral profitable deviation.
Part 2: We now prove that when one of tN or tNoN is
large, then strategy 3) of Theorem 1 is an NE. To do so, we
check conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) of strategy 3) of Theorem 1,
in Parts 2-i, 2-ii, and 2-iii, respectively. Later, in Part 2-iv, we
prove that there is no unilateral profitable deviation for ISPs.
This completes the proof.
Part 2-i: In this part, we check the condition, i.e. κu(2q˜p −
q˜f ) − tNoN < ∆peq < tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ). Note that in this
case:
∆peq =
1
3
(tN − tNoN + (q˜p − q˜f )(2κu − κad)) (19)
Comparing the lower boundary yields that:
κu(2q˜p − q˜f )− tNoN < ∆peq
⇒ 2tNoN + tN + (q˜p − q˜f )(2κu − κad)− 3κu(2q˜p − q˜f ) > 0
which is true when one of tN or tNoN is large. Now, consider
the upper boundary:
∆peq < tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f )
⇒ 2tN + tNoN + κu(q˜p − q˜f )− (q˜p − q˜f )(2κu − κad) > 0
which is true when one of tN or tNoN is large. Thus, condition
(i) of strategy 3) of Theorem 1 is true.
Part 2-ii: Condition (ii) of this strategy is q˜p−q˜f ≤ 2tNoN+tNκu+κad .
This condition holds when one of tN or tNoN is large.
Part 2-iii: Now, we check the third condition, i.e. pieqNoN =
piNoN (p˜
eq
NoN , p˜t,3) > piNoN,z=0(p˜
eq
NoN , p˜). We use (1)-I to find
pieqNoN = piNoN (p˜
eq
NoN , p˜t,3). Note that by using item 2-a-i of
Theorem 2-I (since zeq = 1), (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (q˜f , q˜p). Thus,
by the definition of peqNoN , ∆p
eq , p˜t,3, and using Definition
3-I, Theorem 4-I:
pieqNoN =
(
tNoN + 2tN + (q˜p − q˜f )(κu + κad)
)2
9(tN + tNoN )
(20)
Now, we obtain piNoN,z=0(p˜
eq
NoN , p˜). Consider the case that
p˜ is such that zeq = 0. Note that since κu(2q˜p− q˜f )− tNoN <
∆peq < tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ), then −tNoN < ∆peq < tN or
∆peq ≥ tN . Using item 2 of Theorem 1-I, if ∆peq ≥ tN ,
then nNoN = 0, and by (1)-I, piNoN,z=0(p˜
eq
NoN , p˜) = 0.
Thus, pieqNoN > piNoN,z=0(p˜
eq
NoN , p˜), and this part follows.
Now, consider the case that −tNoN < ∆peq < tN . Using
item 1 of Theorem 1-I, if −tNoN < ∆peq < tN , then
(qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (q˜f , q˜f ) ∈ F I0 . Since (qeqN , qeqNoN ) ∈ F I0 , we can
use (2). Thus, by using peqNoN , ∆p
eq , and , piNoN,z=0(p˜
eq
NoN , p˜)
is:
piNoN,z=0(p˜
eq
NoN , p˜)
=
1
9(tN + tNoN )
(
2tN + tNoN + (q˜p − q˜f )(κu − 2κad)
)
× (2tN + tNoN − (q˜p − q˜f )(2κu − κad))
(21)
Next, we prove that tNoN + 2tN + (q˜p − q˜f )(κu + κad) >
2tN + tNoN + (q˜p− q˜f )(κu− 2κad) and tNoN + 2tN + (q˜p−
q˜f )(κu + κad) > 2tN + tNoN − (q˜p − q˜f )(2κu − κad). This
yields pieqNoN > piNoN,z=0(p˜
eq
NoN , p˜). To prove the inequalities,
18Note that after this deviation, ∆p remains in the same region.
note that:
tNoN + 2tN + (q˜p − q˜f )(κu + κad)
> 2tN + tNoN + (q˜p − q˜f )(κu − 2κad) ⇐⇒ 3κad(q˜p − q˜f ) > 0
tNoN + 2tN + (q˜p − q˜f )(κu + κad)
> 2tN + tNoN − (q˜p − q˜f )(2κu − κad) ⇐⇒ 3κu(q˜p − q˜f ) > 0
Since q˜p > q˜f , both inequalities hold. This completes the
proof of this part.
Part 2-iv: In this part, we prove that there is no profitable
unilateral deviation by ISPs when one of tN or tNoN is large.
To do so, first, in Part 2-iv-NoN, we rule out the possibility
of a profitable deviation by the non-neutral ISP. Then, in Part
2-iv-N, we rule out profitable deviations by the neutral ISP.
Note that, by (20), the equilibrium payoff of ISP NoN,
pieqNoN = piNoN (p˜
eq
NoN , p˜t,3) is:
pieqNoN =
(
tNoN + 2tN + (q˜p − q˜f )(κu + κad)
)2
9(tN + tNoN )
In addition, using (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (q˜f , q˜p), p
eq
N , ∆p
eq , and (1),
we can find pieqN = piN (p˜
eq
N ),:
pieqN =
(
2tNoN + tN − (q˜p − q˜f )(κu + κad)
)2
9(tN + tNoN )
(22)
Note that when tN and tNoN are large, pi
eq
N and pi
eq
NoN would
be large.
Consider different regions in Theorem 2-I. We denote
∆p ≤ κuq˜p − tNoN by region A, κuq˜p − tNoN < ∆p <
∆pt = κu(2q˜p − q˜f )− tNoN by region B1, ∆pt = κu(2q˜p −
q˜f ) − tNoN ≤ ∆p < tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ) by region C,
tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ) ≤ ∆p < tN + κuq˜p by B2, and ∆p ≥
tN + κuq˜p by D. Recall that ∆peq = p
eq
NoN − peqN is in region
C. Note that the payoffs are concave in C, and we found the
strategies by solving the first order condition. Thus, there is
no unilateral profitable deviation in C.
Part 2-iv-NoN: Now, we consider unilateral deviations by ISP
NoN. We prove that any deviation to regions A, B1, B2, and
D is not profitable in Cases 2-iv-NoN-A, 2-iv-NoN-B1, 2-iv-
NoN-B2, and 2-iv-NoN-D, respectively. This yields that no
deviation is profitable for ISP NoN.
Case 2-iv-NoN-A: First, we prove that in Region A,
zeq = 1. Note that in this case, by Definition 4-I, p˜t =
p˜t,1. Thus, piNoN (pNoN , p˜t) = pNoN − c + q˜pp˜t,1 =
pNoN − c + κad(q˜p − q˜f ) (by (1)-I, Definition 3-I, and
since nNoN = 1 by item 1 of Theorem 2-I). On the
other hand, piNoN,z=0(pNoN , p˜) = (pNoN − c)nNoN . Thus,
piNoN (pNoN , p˜t) > piNoN,z=0(pNoN , p˜) (since q˜p > q˜f and
0 ≤ nNoN ≤ 1). Thus, by Theorem 3-I, in region A, zeq = 1.
Now, consider peqN fixed and decreasing pNoN such that ∆p
in region A, i.e. ∆p ≤ κuq˜p − tNoN . Since in Region A,
zeq = 1, and by Theorem 4-I, the payoff after deviation is
pi′NoN = pNoN − c+ q˜pp˜t,1 (by (1)-I, Definition 3-I, and since
nNoN = 1 by item 1 of Theorem 2-I). Thus, the payoff of
the ISP NoN is an increasing function of pNoN . Therefore, all
other prices are dominated by p′NoN = p
eq
N +κuq˜p−tNoN . The
payoff in this case is pi′NoN = p
eq
N +κuq˜p− tNoN − c+ q˜pp˜t,1
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(by (1)-I). Therefore:
pi′NoN =
1
3
(tN − tNoN ) + α (23)
where α is a constant independent of tN and tNoN . Now, in
Cases (i), (ii), and (iii), we prove that pieqNoN > pi
′
NoN when
(i) tN is sufficiently larger than other parameters, (ii) tNoN is
sufficiently larger than other parameters, and (iii) tN and tNoN
are of the same order of magnitude and both are sufficiently
larger than other parameters, respectively.
Case (i): If tN is sufficiently larger than other parameters,
then:
pieqNoN ≈
4tN
9
> pi′NoN ≈
1
3
tN
Thus, this deviation is not profitable.
Case (ii): If tNoN is sufficiently larger than other parameters,
then:
pieqNoN ≈
tNoN
9
> pi′NoN ≈ −
1
3
tNoN
Thus, this deviation is also not profitable.
Case (iii): If tN and tNoN are of the same order of magnitude
(tN ≈ tNoN ) and both are sufficiently larger than other
parameters, then:
pieqNoN =
tN
2
>
tN
3
> pi′NoN
Thus, this deviation is not profitable.
Thus, any deviation to region A by ISP NoN is not prof-
itable. This completes the proof of this case.
Case 2-iv-NoN-B1: Now, consider a deviation by ISP NoN to
region B1, i.e. κuq˜p − tNoN < ∆p < ∆pt = κu(2q˜p − q˜f )−
tNoN . Note that with this deviation, p′NoN =
1
3 (tN − tNoN )+
α, where αl < α < αu, in which αl and αu are bounded. In
addition, by (5)-I, after the deviation, n′NoN =
tN+tNoN−β
tN+tNoN
,
where β > 0 is bounded (βl < β < βu, and βl and βu
bounded ). Therefore, for large tN and tNoN , n′NoN → 1.
Thus, by (2), the payoff of ISP NoN after deviation is:
pi′NoN =
1
3
(tN − tNoN ) + γ
where γ is bounded (Note that p˜ is independent of tN and
tNoN ). This expression is similar to (23). Thus, we can exactly
repeat the arguments in Cases i, ii, and iii to prove that any
deviation to region B1 by ISP NoN is not profitable. This
completes the proof of this case.
Case 2-iv-NoN-B2: Now, consider a deviation by ISP NoN to
region B2, i.e. tN +κu(q˜p− q˜f ) ≤ ∆p < tN +κuq˜p. Note that
with this deviation, ∆p′ = tN+α, and p′NoN =
2tNoN+4tN
3 +γ
where κu(q˜p − q˜f ) ≤ α ≤ κuq˜p and thus γ is bounded. Thus,
by (5)-I, after this deviation, n′NoN =
β
tN+tNoN
, where β > 0
is a constant independent of tN and tNoN , and the payoff of
ISP NoN after deviation is pi′NoN =
2tNoN+4tN
3(tN+tNoN )
β+ η (by (1)-
I and considering that by Theorem 4-I, if zeq = 1, then p˜ =
p˜t,2,, and independent of tN and tNoN ), where η is a constant
independent of tN and tNoN . Thus, when one of tN and tNoN
is large, pi′NoN → constant. Therefore, pieqNoN > pi′NoN . Thus,
any deviation to region B2 by ISP NoN is not profitable.
Case 2-iv-NoN-D: By item 4 of Theorem 2-I, in region D,
nNoN = 0. Thus, a deviation to this region, yields a payoff of
zero, by (2) and zeq = 0. Thus, a deviation of this kind is not
profitable for ISP NoN.
Part 2-iv-N: Now, consider unilateral deviations by the neutral
ISP. Similar to Part 2-iv-N, we prove that any deviation to
regions A, B1, B2, and D is not profitable. We do so in Cases
2-iv-N-A, 2-iv-N-B1, 2-iv-N-B2, and 2-iv-N-D, respectively.
Case 2-iv-N-A: Consider a deviation by ISP N to region A. In
this case, by item 1 of Theorem 2-I, nN = 0. Thus, the payoff
of ISP N after deviation is zero (by (1)), and this deviation is
not profitable.
Case 2-iv-N-B1: Now, consider a deviation by ISP N to region
B1, i.e. κuq˜p − tNoN < ∆p < ∆pt = κu(2q˜p − q˜f ) − tNoN .
Note that with this deviation, ∆p = −tNoN + α, and p′N =
4tNoN+2tN
3 + γ, where κuq˜p < α < κu(2q˜p − q˜f ) and thus
γ is bounded. Thus, by (5)-I, n′N =
β
tN+tNoN
, where β > 0
is bounded. By (1)-I. The payoff of ISP N after deviation is
piN =
4tNoN+2tN
3(tN+tNoN )
β (by (1)-I). Thus, when one of tN and
tNoN is large, pi′N → constant. Thus, pieqN > pi′N . Therefore,
any deviation to region B1 by ISP N is not profitable.
case 2-iv-N-B2: Now, consider a deviation by ISP NoN to
region B2, i.e. tN +κu(q˜p− q˜f ) ≤ ∆p < tN +κuq˜p. Note that
with this deviation, ∆p′ = tN +α, where κu(q˜p − q˜f ) ≤ α <
κuq˜p. Thus, p′N =
1
3 (tNoN − tN ) + β, where β is bounded.
In addition, by (5)-I, after the deviation, n′N =
tN+tNoN−γ
tN+tNoN
,
where γ > 0 is bounded. Therefore, for large tN or tNoN ,
n′N → 1. Thus, by (1), the payoff of ISP N after deviation is:
pi′N =
1
3
(tNoN − tN ) + η (24)
where η is bounded. Now, in Cases i, ii, and iii, we prove that
pieqN > pi
′
N when (i) tN is sufficiently larger than other parame-
ters, (ii) tNoN is sufficiently larger than other parameters, and
(iii) tN and tNoN are of the same order of magnitude and both
are sufficiently larger than other parameters, respectively.
Case i: If tN is sufficiently larger than other parameters, then:
pieqN ≈
tN
9
> pi′N ≈ −
1
3
tN
Thus, this deviation is not profitable.
Case ii: If tNoN is sufficiently larger than other parameters,
then:
pieqN ≈
4tNoN
9
> pi′N ≈
1
3
tNoN
Thus, this deviation is also not profitable.
Case iii: If tN and tNoN are of the same order of magnitude
(tN ≈ tNoN ) and both are sufficiently larger than other
parameters, then:
pieqN =
tNoN
2
>
tNoN
3
> pi′N
Thus, this deviation is not profitable.
Thus, any deviation to Region B2 by ISP N is not profitable.
This completes the proof of this case.
Case 2-iv-N-D: Now, consider decreasing pNoN such that ∆p
in region D, i.e. ∆p ≥ κuq˜p + tN . Note that by item 4 of
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Theorem 2-I, zeq = 0, and nN = 1. Thus, the payoff of
ISP N is equal to pN − c (by (1)-I). Thus, the payoff of the
ISP N is an increasing function of pN . Therefore, all other
prices are dominated by p′N = p
eq
NoN − (κuq˜p+ tN ). Thus, the
payoff in this case is pi′N =
1
3 (tNoN − tN ) + α, where α is a
constant and is independent of tN and tNoN . This expression
is similar to (24). Thus, we can exactly repeat the arguments
in Cases 2-iv-N-B2-a, 2-iv-N-B2-b, and 2-iv-N-B2-c to prove
that any deviation to region D by ISP NoN is not profitable.
This completes the proof of this case. This completes the proof
of this case, and the theorem.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3 AND COROLLARY 2
First, we prove Theorem 3:
Proof: We consider different regions of ∆p in Theorem 1-
I and Theorem 2-I. For each region, we characterize all
possible NE strategies.
First, consider ∆p ≤ κuq˜p− tNoN . Note that in this region,
the payoff of non-neutral ISP if zeq = 0 is at most peqNoN − c
(by (1)-I). On the other hand, by Theorem 2-I, by choosing
p˜′ = p˜t,1, ISP NoN can ensure that the CP chooses zeq =
1. In this case, the payoff of non-neutral ISP (by (1)-I) is
p′NoN −c+ p˜t,1q˜NoN = peqNoN −c+κad(q˜p− q˜f ) > peqNoN −c.
Thus, piNoN (p
eq
NoN , p˜t,1) > piNoN,z=0(p
eq
NoN , p˜). Therefore, in
this case, there is no NE by which zeq = 0.
Now, consider ∆p > κuq˜p−tNoN . Note that q˜p < tN+tNoNκu .
Thus, two possibility may arise: (i) −tNoN < ∆p < tN , and
(ii) ∆p ≥ tN . We consider these two cases in Case 1 and 2,
respectively.
Case 1: In this case, −tNoN < ∆p < tN . By item 1 of
Theorem 1-I, (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (q˜f , q˜f ) ∈ F I0 . Note that in this
region, 0 < xN < 1, and an NE strategy for ISPs should
satisfy the first order optimality conditions. Thus, using (1)
and (2):
piN (pN ) = (pN − c) tNoN + pNoN − pN
tN + tNoN
piNoN (pNoN , p˜) = (pNoN − c) tN + pN − pNoN
tN + tNoN
Solving the first order optimality condition yields:
peqN = c+
1
3
(2tNoN + tN )
peqNoN = c+
1
3
(2tN + tNoN )
(25)
which is unique. Note that peqN ≥ c and peqNoN ≥ c. First, note
that −tNoN < ∆peq = peqNoN − peqN = tN−tNoN3 < tN .
The necessary condition for this strategy to be an NE is
piNoN,z=0(p
eq
NoN ) ≥ piNoN (peqNoN , p˜t) (by Theorem 3-I). The
candidate strategies and this necessary condition is listed in
the statement of the theorem.
Case 2: Now, consider ∆p ≥ tN . We consider two cases
∆p = tN and ∆p > tN in Cases 2-i and 2-ii, respectively.
Case 2-i: Now consider strategies pNoN and pN such that
∆p = tN . In this case, using case 2 of Theorem 1-
I, (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (q˜f , 0) ∈ FU0 . Thus, nNoN = 0 and
piNoN (pNoN , z = 0) = 0, i.e. the payoff of the non-neutral
ISP is zero. Consider  > 0 such that p′NoN = pNoN −  > c.
In this case, p′NoN − pN < tN . Thus, by Theorem 1-I,
(qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) ∈ F I0 or (qeqN , qeqNoN ) ∈ FL0 . Thus, nNoN > 0,
and piNoN (p′NoN , z = 0) > 0. Thus, p
′
NoN is a profitable
deviation for the non-neutral ISP. Therefore, as long as such
a deviation exist pNoN and pN such that ∆p = tN cannot be
NE.
Case 2-ii: Now, consider ∆p > tN . Thus, by item 2 of
Theorem 1-I, neqN = 1. Consider a unilateral deviation by
neutral ISP such that p′N = p
eq
N +  in which  > 0 such that
peqNoN − p′N > tN . Note that the values of qeqN and qeqNoN is
the same as before, since still ∆p′ = peqNoN − p′N > tN . Thus,
again neqN = 1, and by (1)-I, the payoff of neutral ISP is an
increasing function of pN . Thus, p′N is a profitable unilateral
deviation. This contradicts the assumption that peqN and p
eq
NoN
is NE. Thus, the result of the theorem follows.
Now, we prove Corollary 2:
Proof: Note that we constructed this strategy such that
∆p satisfies item 1 of Theorem 1-I. Thus, (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) =
(q˜f , q˜f ) ∈ F I0 . Using the expression for ∆p = peqNoN − peqN ,
and (5)-I, the expressions for neqN and n
eq
NoN follow.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
The following lemmas allow us to characterize the NE when
(qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) ∈ F0, i.e. zeq = 0.
Lemmas 1 and 2 are useful in proving Theorem 4.
Lemma 1. No pNoN and pN such that ∆p = pNoN − pN ≤
−tNoN can be equilibrium strategies.
Proof: First, we rule out the existence of an NE when
∆p < −tNoN , and then when ∆p = −tNoN .
First, consider pNoN and pN such that ∆p < −tNoN . In
this case, pNoN < pN − tNoN . Note that the payoff of the
non-neutral ISP when ∆p ≤ −tNoN is pNoN − c (by (1)-I
and nNoN = 1, using case 3 of Theorem 1-I), and is strictly
increasing with respect to pNoN . Thus, every price pNoN <
pN−tNoN yields a strictly lower payoff for the non-neutral ISP
in comparison with the payoff of the this ISP when pNoN =
pN − tNoN . Thus, there exist a profitable deviation for the
non-neutral ISP for strategies such that pNoN −pN < −tNoN .
Therefore, no pNoN and pN such that pNoN − pN < −tNoN
can be NE strategies.
Now consider strategies pNoN and pN such that ∆p =
−tNoN . In this case, using case 3 of Theorem 1-I,
(qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (0, q˜f ) ∈ FL0 . Thus, nN = 0 and piN (pN ) = 0,
i.e. the payoff of the neutral ISP is zero. Consider  > 0 such
that p′N = pN −  > c. In this case, pNoN − p′N > −tNoN .
Thus, by Theorem 1-I, (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) ∈ F I0 or (qeqN , qeqNoN ) ∈
FU0 . Thus, nN > 0, and piN (p
′
N ) > 0. Thus, p
′
N is a profitable
deviation for the neutral ISP. Therefore, as long as such a
deviation exist pNoN and pN such that ∆p = −tNoN cannot
be NE. Now, we prove that such deviation always exist. This
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complete the proof. Note that this deviation does not exist if
and only if pN −  ≤ c for all  > 0. Therefore, this deviation
does not exist if only if pN ≤ c. Thus, pNoN ≤ c− tNoN < c,
which contradicts the fact that if z = 0, peqNoN ≥ c (as
mentioned in the beginning of the section). The lemma follows.
Lemma 2. No pNoN and pN such that ∆p ≥ tN can be
equilibrium strategies.
Proof: First, we rule out the existence of an NE when
∆p > tN , and then when ∆p = tN .
First, consider pNoN and pN such that ∆p > tN . In this
case, pN < pNoN − tN . Note that the payoff of the neutral
ISP when ∆p ≥ tN is pN − c (by (1)-I and nN = 1, using
case 2 of Theorem 1-I), and is strictly increasing with respect
to pN . Thus, every price pN < pNoN − tN yields a strictly
lower payoff for the neutral ISP in comparison with the payoff
of the this ISP when pN = pNoN − tN . Thus, no pNoN and
pN such that pNoN − pN > tN can be Ne strategies.
Now consider strategies pNoN and pN such that ∆p = tN .
In this case, using case 2 of Theorem 1-I, (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) =
(q˜f , 0) ∈ FU0 . Thus, nNoN = 0 and piNoN (pNoN , z = 0) =
0, i.e. the payoff of the non-neutral ISP is zero. Consider
 > 0 such that p′NoN = pNoN −  > c. In this case,
p′NoN−pN < tN . Thus, by Theorem 1-I, (qeqN , qeqNoN ) ∈ F I0 or
(qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) ∈ FL0 . Thus, nNoN > 0, and piNoN (p′NoN , z =
0) > 0. Thus, p′NoN is a profitable deviation for the non-
neutral ISP. Therefore, as long as such a deviation exist pNoN
and pN such that ∆p = tN cannot be NE. Now, we prove that
such deviation always exist. This complete the proof. Note that
this deviation does not exist if and only if pNoN −  ≤ c for
all  > 0. Therefore, this deviation does not exist if only if
pNoN ≤ c. Therefore, pN ≤ c− tN < c, which contradicts the
fact that peqN ≥ c (as mentioned after at the beginning of the
section.). The lemma follows.
Now, we proceed to prove Theorem 4:
Proof: First, in Part 1, we characterize the candidate equi-
librium strategies by applying the first order condition on the
payoffs. Then, in Part 2, we prove that no unilateral deviation
is profitable for ISPs. Thus, the strategies characterized in Part
1 are NE.
Part 1: Note that zeq = 0. First note that by Lemmas 1 and
2, no pN and pNoN such that ∆p ≤ −tNoN or ∆p ≥ tN can
be Nash equilibrium. Thus, we consider −tNoN < ∆p < tN .
Note that in this region, 0 < xN < 1, and an NE strategy for
ISPs should satisfy the first order optimality conditions. Thus,
using (1) and (2), and item 1 of Theorem 1-I:
peqN = c+
1
3
(2tNoN + tN )
peqNoN = c+
1
3
(2tN + tNoN )
(26)
which is unique. Note that peqN ≥ c and peqNoN ≥ c. In order
to prove that this is an NE, it is enough to prove that (i)
−tNoN < ∆peq = peqNoN−peqN < tN , (ii) a deviation of one of
the ISPs by which ∆p is shifted to the region ∆p ≤ −tNoN
or ∆p ≥ tN is not profitable for that ISP.
The condition (i) can be proved by (26). From this equation,
∆peq = tN−tNoN3 . Thus, ∆p
eq > −tNoN and ∆peq < tN .
Therefore, (i) is true for this case.
Part 2: Now, we should prove that condition (ii) holds, i.e.
no unilateral deviation is profitable. First, in Case 2-a, we rule
out the possibility of a unilateral deviation when −tNoN <
∆p < tN for both neutral and non-neutral ISPs. Then, we
consider ∆p ≤ −tNoN and ∆p ≥ tN , and in Cases 2-NoN
and 2-N, we rule out the possibility of a unilateral deviation
in these regions for ISP N and NoN, respectively.
Case 2-a: First, note that by concavity of the payoffs (using
(1) and (2)) as long as −tNoN < ∆p < tN , i.e. 0 < xN < 1,
a unilateral deviation by one of the ISPs from peqN or p
eq
NoN
decreases this ISP’s payoff. Thus, we should consider the
deviation by ISPs by which ∆p ≤ −tNoN or ∆p ≥ tN .
Case 2-NoN: Now, consider the deviations by the non-
neutral ISP. Fix pN = p
eq
N , and consider two cases. In Case
2-NoN-i (respectively, Case 2-NoN-ii), we consider deviation
by ISP NoN such that ∆p ≥ tN (respectively, ∆p ≤ −tNoN ).
Case 2-NoN-i: Suppose the non-neutral ISP increases her
price from peqNoN to make ∆p ≥ tN . In this case, nNoN =
0, and the payoff of the ISP is zero (by (1)-I). Since in the
candidate equilibrium strategy this payoff is non-negative19,
this deviation is not profitable.
Case 2-NoN-ii: Now, consider the case in which the non-
neutral ISP decreases her price to make ∆p ≤ −tNoN . In
this case, nNoN = 1 and piNoN (p′NoN , z = 0) = p
′
NoN − c
(by (1)-I). Thus, the payoff is a strictly increasing function of
p′NoN , and is maximized at p
′
NoN = p
eq
N − tNoN . We show
that piNoN (p′NoN , z = 0) < piNoN (p
eq
NoN , z = 0)
20. Note that
piNoN (p
′
NoN , z = 0) =
1
3 (tN − tNoN ). In addition, using (26),
(1)-I, 0 ≤ xN ≤ 1, (5)-I, and the fact that with peqN and peqNoN ,
qeqNoN − qeqN = 0:
piNoN (p
eq
NoN , z = 0) =
1
9
(2tN + tNoN )
2
tNoN + tN
Thus:
piNoN (p
′
NoN , z = 0) < piNoN (p
eq
NoN , z = 0)
⇐⇒ 3(t2N − t2NoN ) < 4t2N + t2NoN + 4tN tNoN
⇐⇒ t2N + 4t2NoN + 4tN tNoN > 0
where the last inequality is always true. Thus, this deviation
is not profitable for ISP NoN.
These cases prove that no deviation form (26) is profitable
for ISP NoN.
Case 2-N: Now, consider a deviation by the neutral ISP
from (26). Similar argument can be done for the neutral ISP.
Fix, pNoN = p
eq
NoN , and consider two cases. In Case 2-N-i
(respectively, Case 2-N-ii), we consider deviation by ISP N
such that ∆p ≤ −tNoN (respectively, ∆p ≥ tN ).
Case 2-N-i: Suppose the neutral ISP increases her price
from peqN to get ∆p ≤ −tNoN . In this case, nN = 0, and the
payoff of this ISP is zero. Since in the candidate equilibrium
strategy the payoff is non-negative21, this deviation is not
profitable.
19Note that peqNoN > c and 0 ≤ nNoN ≤ 1.
20note that pN = p
eq
N is fixed.
21Note that peqN > c and 0 ≤ nN ≤ 1.
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Case 2-N-ii: Now, consider the case in which the non-
neutral ISP decreases her price such that ∆p ≥ tN . In this
case, nN = 1 and piN (p′N ) = p
′
N − c. Thus, the payoff
is a strictly increasing function of p′N , and is maximized at
p′N = p
eq
NoN − tN . We show that piN (p′N ) < piN (peqN ). Note
that piN (p′N ) =
1
3 (tNoN − tN ) (by (1)-I). In addition, using
(26), (1)-I, 0 ≤ xN ≤ 1, (5)-I, and the fact that with peqN and
peqNoN , q
eq
NoN − qeqN = 0:
piN (p
eq
N ) =
1
9
(2tNoN + tN )
2
tNoN + tN
Thus:
piN (p
′
N ) < piN (p
eq
N )
⇐⇒ 3(t2NoN − t2N ) < 4t2NoN + t2N + 4tN tNoN
⇐⇒ t2NoN + 4t2N + 4tN tNoN > 0
where the last inequality is always true. Thus, this deviation
is not profitable for ISP N.
Thus, there is no profitable deviation for ISP N. This
completes the proof, and the lemma follows.
APPENDIX E
CONTINUOUS STRATEGY SET FOR THE CP
In this section, we consider qN ∈ [0, q˜f ] and qNoN ∈ [0, q˜p].
In this case, the CP pays a side payment of p˜qNoN if she
chooses qNoN ∈ (q˜f , q˜p]. The rest of the model is the same as
before. Note that in this case, the optimum strategies in Stage
4 of the game, in which end-users decide on the ISP, is the
same as before. We prove that the optimum decisions made by
the CP is similar to the decisions of the CP when she has a
discrete set of strategies (explained in the paper). This yields
that the results of the model would the same as before when
the CP chooses her strategy from a continuous set.
Therefore, we focus on characterizing the optimum strate-
gies of the CP when she chooses her strategy from continuous
sets, i.e. qN ∈ [0, q˜f ] and qNoN ∈ [0, q˜p]. The following lemma
is useful in defining the maximization and to characterize the
optimum answers.
Lemma 3. piCP (qN , q˜f,NoN , z = 0) ≥ piCP (qN , q˜f,NoN , z =
1).
Remark 6. Note that although we considered z to be a dummy
variable, in this lemma and for the purpose of analysis, we
treat it as an independent variable.
Proof: The lemma follows by (2)-I, and comparing the
expressions in these two cases:
piCP (qN , q˜f,NoN , z = 0)− piCP (qN , q˜f,NoN , z = 1) = q˜f,NoN p˜ ≥ 0
Note that we used the fact that from (5)-I, since the qualities
are the same in both cases, nN and nNoN are equal for both
cases.
Lemma 3 provides the ground to formally define the maxi-
mization for the CP as:
max
z,qN ,qNoN
piCP (qN , qNoN , z) =
max
z,qN ,qNoN
(
nNκadqN + nNoNκadqNoN − zp˜qNoN
)
s.t:
qN ≤ q˜f
if z = 1 q˜f < qNoN ≤ q˜p
if z = 0 qNoN ≤ q˜f
(27)
Existence of the maximum: Note that the mixed integer
programming (27) can be written as two convex maximiza-
tions, one for z = 0 and one for z = 1. In addition,
note that for the case z = 1, the feasible set is not closed
(since q˜f < qNoN ≤ q˜p). Thus, in this case, we should
use the “supremum” instead of “maximum”. However, using
Lemma 3, we prove that the maximum of (27) exists, and
therefore the term maximum can be used safely. To prove this,
consider the closure of the feasible set when z = 1 formed by
adding q˜f to the set, i.e. F˜1. Since the feasible set associated
with z = 0 (F0) and the closure of the feasible set associated to
z = 1 (F˜1) are closed and bounded (compact) and the objective
function is continuous for each z ∈ {0, 1}, using Weierstrass
Extreme Value Theorem, we can say that a maximum exists in
each of these two sets and for the overall optimization (27). If
the maxima in F˜1 is not q˜f , then the maxima is in the original
feasible set (F1). Therefore the maximum of (27) exists. If
not and q˜f is the maxima in the set F˜1, then by Lemma 3, the
maximum in the set F0 dominates the maximum of the set F˜1.
Thus, the maxima of (27) is in F0. Therefore, the maximum
of (27) exists, and we can use the term maximum safely.
Henceforth, the solution (q˜∗N , q˜
∗
NoN , z
∗) of the maximiza-
tion (27) would be called the optimum strategies of the CP.
This solution yields x∗N and subsequently n
∗
N and n
∗
NoN by
(5)-I. In addition, we denote the feasible set of (27) by F .
Finding the optimum strategies of the CP: To characterize
the optimum strategies, we use the partition the feasible set in
Table I-I, and characterize the candidate optimum strategies,
i.e. the strategies that yield a higher payoff than the rest of the
feasible solutions, in each subset. The overall optimum, which
is chosen by the CP, is the one that yields the highest payoff
among candidate strategies.
Note that although the maximum of the overall optimization
exist, a maximum may not necessarily exist in each of the
subsets. We will show in the next set of lemmas that the
optimization in each subset of the feasible set can be reduced to
a convex maximization over linear constraints. Thus, only the
extreme points of the feasible sets may constitute the optimum
solution. This means that the CP chooses her strategy among
the discrete strategies, qN ∈ {0, q˜f} and qNoN ∈ {0, q˜f , q˜p}.
We now characterize optimum strategies of the CP, by
considering each of the sub-feasible sets and characterizing the
optimum solutions in each of them. In Lemma 6, we prove that
if (q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ F I , then q∗N ∈ {0, q˜f}, q∗NoN ∈ {0, q˜f , q˜p},
and (q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) 6= (0, 0). In Lemma 8, we prove that if
(q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ FL, then q∗NoN = q˜f , if q∗NoN ∈ FL0 ,
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and q∗NoN = q˜p, if q
∗
NoN ∈ FL1 . Moreover, 0 ≤ q∗N ≤
1
κu
(κuq
∗
NoN − tNoN − ∆p), and ∆p ≤ κuq∗NoN − tNoN . In
Lemma 9, we prove that if (q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ FU , then q∗N = q˜f
and 0 ≤ q∗NoN ≤ 1κu (κuq˜f − tN + ∆p) and ∆p ≥ tN − κuq˜f .
In addition, Lemmas 4 and 5 provide some results that are
useful in proving Lemmas 6-9.
Lemma 4. In an optimum solution of (27), nNoNκad−zp˜ ≥ 0.
Proof: Suppose there exists an optimum answer such that
nNoNκad−zp˜ < 0. Note that 0 ≤ nN , nNoN ≤ 1 and qualities
are non-negative. Thus, in this case, piCP < κadqN . However,
choosing z = 0 and qNoN = qN , yields a profit equal to
κadqN . This contradicts the solution with nNoNκad − zp˜ < 0
to be optimum. Thus, the Lemma follows.
Lemma 5. In an optimum solution, the CP offers the content
quality equal to one of the threshold at least on one ISP, i.e.
q∗N = q˜f OR (q
∗
NoN = q˜p XOR q
∗
NoN = q˜f ), where XOR
means only one the qualities is chosen.
Proof: Suppose not. Let the optimum qualities to be
qˆNoN < q˜f if z = 0, or q˜f < qˆNoN < q˜p if z = 1, and
qˆN < q˜f . The difference between the qualities offered in two
platforms is ∆q = qˆNoN − qˆN . Consider q′NoN = qˆNoN + 
and q′N = qˆN+ in which  > 0 and is such that q
′
NoN ≤ q˜f if
z = 0, or q˜f ≤ q′NoN ≤ q˜p if z = 1, and q′N ≤ q˜f . Note that z
remains fixed and q′NoN − q′N = qˆNoN − qˆN = ∆q. Since ∆q
is the same for two cases, the number of subscriber to each
ISP is the same for both cases by (5)-I. Lemma 4, (2)-I, and
the fact that nN , nNoN ≥ 0 yield that pi′CP ≥ pˆiCP , where
pˆiCP (, respectively pi′CP ) is the payoff of the CP when the
vector of qualities is (qˆN , qˆNoN ) (, respectively, (q′N , q
′
NoN )).
We now prove if (qˆN , qˆNoN ) is the optimum solution, then
the inequality is strict, i.e. pi′CP > pˆiCP . Suppose not, and
pi′CP = pˆiCP . This only happens if nNoNκad − zp˜ = 0 and
nN = 0. Note that in this case, pi′CP = pˆiCP = 0. However,
in the previous paragraph, we argued that with qN = q˜f and
qNoN = q˜f , the CP can get a payoff of κadq˜f > 0. This
contradicts the assumption that (qˆN , qˆNoN ) is the optimum
solution. Thus, pi′CP > pˆiCP .
This inequality contradicts the assumption that (qˆN , qˆNoN )
is the optimum solution. Thus, the result follows.
Clearly, the decision of the CP about the vector of qualities
depends on the parameter xN (4)-I, and subsequently on nN .
First, we characterize the candidate strategies of the CP when
0 ≤ xN ≤ 1, i.e. (q∗N , q∗NoN ) ∈ F I and therefore nN =
xN . Then, we consider the case of xN < 0 (nN = 0 and
(q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ FL) and xN > 1 (nN = 1 and (q∗N , q∗NoN ) ∈
FU ). Finally, we combine both cases to determine the optimum
strategies of the CP. In the following lemma, we characterize
the candidate optimum qualities in F I , i.e. the strategies by
which 0 ≤ xN ≤ 1.
Lemma 6. If (q∗N , q∗NoN ) ∈ F I , i.e. optimum strategies are
such that 0 < x∗N < 1, then q
∗
N ∈ {0, q˜f}, q∗NoN ∈ {0, q˜f , q˜p},
(q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) 6= (0, 0).
Remark 7. Note that to be in F I and from (5)-I, (q∗N , q∗NoN )
should be such that ∆p−tNκu < ∆q
∗ = q∗NoN−q∗N < ∆p+tNoNκu .
In Lemma 5, we have proved that the quality on at least one
of the ISPs is equal to a threshold. In this lemma, we prove
that the qualities offered on both ISPs are equal to thresholds
or one of them is zero.
Proof: We would like to characterize the optimum qual-
ities in F I = F I0
⋃
F I1 , i.e. optimum strategies for which
0 < xN < 1. First note that by Lemma 5, either (a) q∗N = c
and q∗NoN = c + ∆q where c = q˜f , or (b) q
∗
NoN = c and
q∗N = c−∆q where c ∈ {q˜f , q˜p}. Note that the feasible sets for
each case can be rewritten as a function of ∆q. We characterize
the candidate solutions for each case:
• Case (a): The feasible set for the case (a) is ∆q ∈ G0 =
[−c, q˜f − c] (for z = 0) and ∆q ∈ G1 = (q˜f − c, q˜p− c]
(for z = 1), where c = q˜f . Let G = G0 ∪G1. Note that
if 0 ≤ xN ≤ 1, then nN = xN and nNoN = 1 − xN .
Thus, (27) can be written as,
max
z,∆q∈G=G0∪G1
piCP (c, c+ ∆q, z) =
max
z,∆q∈G
(
tNoN − κu∆q + pNoN − pN
)
κadc+
+
(
tN + κu∆q + pN − pNoN
)
κad(c+ ∆q)− zp˜(c+ ∆q)
(28)
Note that although the feasible set G1 is not closed, we
used maximum instead of supremum. We will show that
the maximum of (28) exists. Thus, the term maximum
can be used safely. Note that the objective functions
of (28) is a strictly convex functions of ∆q. Note
that henceforth wherever we refer to maximum without
further clarification, we refer to the solution of (27).
Let G˜1 be the closure of G1, then G˜1\G1 = {q˜f −
c}. First, we prove that the maximum of (28) exists.
Note that G0 and G˜1 are closed and bounded (compact)
and the objective function of (28) is continuous with
respect to ∆q for each z ∈ {0, 1}. Using Weierstrass
Extreme Value Theorem, we can say that a maxima for
piCP (c,∆q+ c, z = 0) and piCP (c,∆q+ c, z = 1) exists
in each of two sets G0 and G˜1, respectively. Thus, the
overall maximum for the objective function of (28) over
G0 and G˜1 exists. Now, consider two cases:
1) If the maxima of piCP (c,∆q + c, z = 1) in G˜1 is
not ∆q = q˜f−c, then the maxima is in the original
feasible set (G1). Therefore the maximum of (28)
exists (since G0 is closed).
2) If ∆q = q˜f − c is the maxima of piCP (c,∆q +
c, z = 1) in the set G˜1, then by Lemma 3, the
maximum of piCP (c,∆q + c, z = 0) in the set
G0 greater than or equal to the maximum of
piCP (c,∆q + c, z = 1) in G˜1. Thus, the maxima
of (28) over G0 and G1 exists and is in G0.
Now, that we have proved the existence of the maximum
for (28), we aim to find all the candidate optimum
solutions. Note that the set G0 is closed. Thus, by the
strict convexity of the objective function of (28), the
candidate optimums in G0 are the extreme points of G0.
Using the definition of this feasible set, the candidate
answers are (i) q∗N = q˜f and q
∗
NoN ∈ {0, q˜f}.
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Now, consider the feasible set G˜1, and consider two
cases:
1) If ∆q = q˜f − c is not the unique maxima of
(28) in G˜1, then the maxima is in G1 or G0.
The candidate answers in the set G0 are already
characterized. In addition, by strict convexity of
the objective function, the maxima can only be an
extreme point of G˜1. Since q˜f−c is not the unique
maxima of (27) in G˜1, q˜p is a maxima of (27) in
G1. Thus, by strong convexity, for all ∆q ∈ G1
piCP (c, q˜p, z = 1) > piCP (c,∆q + c, z = 1), and
the only candidate optimum solution over G1 is
at ∆q = q˜p − c ∈ G1 which yields (ii) q∗N = q˜f
and q∗NoN = q˜p.
2) If q˜f − c is the unique maxima in G˜1, then
piCP (c, q˜f , z = 1) > piCP (c,∆q + c, z = 1)
for ∆q ∈ G1. By Lemma 3, piCP (c, q˜f , z =
0) ≥ piCP (c, q˜f , z = 1). Therefore, the overall
maximum of (28) is in the set G0, and is as
characterized previously.
• Case (b): The feasible set for the case (b) is ∆q ∈ Gˆ0 =
[c − q˜f , c] where c = q˜f (for z = 0), and ∆q ∈ Gˆ1 =
[c− q˜f , c] where c = q˜p (for z = 1). For this case, (27)
can be written as:
max
z,∆q∈Gˆ=Gˆ0∪Gˆ1
piCP (c−∆q, c, z) =
max
z,∆q∈Gˆ
κad
(
tNoN − κu∆q + pNoN − pN
)
(c−∆q)+
+ κadc
(
tN + κu∆q + pN − pNoN
)− zp˜c
(29)
Note that the feasible set is closed. Thus the term
maximum is fine. In addition, the objective functions
of (29) are strictly convex functions of ∆q. Thus, using
the strict convexity and the definition of the feasible set,
i.e. c− q˜f ≤ ∆q∗ ≤ c where c is q˜f and q˜p, respectively,
we can get the other set of candidate answers, (iii)
q∗NoN = q˜f and q˜
∗
N ∈ {0, q˜f}, and (iv) q˜∗NoN = q˜p
and q˜∗N ∈ {0, q˜f}.
From, (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv), the result follows.
The following corollary follows immediately from Lemma
6:
Corollary 4. The possible candidate optimum strategies by
which 0 < x∗N < 1, i.e. (q
∗
N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ F I , are (1) (0, q˜f ), (2)
(q˜f , 0), and (3) (q˜f , q˜f ) when z = 0, i.e. (q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ F I0 ,
and (1) (0, q˜p) and (2) (q˜f , q˜p) when z = 1, i.e. (q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈
F I1 . Note that the necessary and sufficient condition for each
of these candidate outcomes to be in F I is ∆p−tNκu < ∆q
∗ <
∆p+tNoN
κu
.
Note that Corollary 4 lists all the candidate answers by
which 0 < xN < 1. In the next three lemmas, we focus on
the candidate answers when xN ≥ 1 or xN ≤ 0.
Lemma 7. If ∆p > κuq˜f − tNoN then xN > 0 for all choices
of qNoN and qN in the feasible set F0 22. Similarly, If ∆p >
κuq˜p − tNoN then xN > 0 for all choices of qNoN and qN
in the feasible set F1 23. In addition, if ∆p < tN − κuq˜f then
xN < 1 for all choices of qNoN and qN in the overall feasible
set F24.
Proof: First note that from (5)-I, xN > 0 is equivalent to:
∆p > κu(qNoN − qN )− tNoN (30)
Consider ∆p > κuq˜f − tNoN (respectively, ∆p > κuq˜p −
tNoN ), if (qN , qNoN ) ∈ F0 (respectively, (qN , qNoN ) ∈ F1)
then ∆p > κuq˜f − tNoN ≥ κu(qNoN − qN )− tNoN (respec-
tively, ∆p > κuq˜p−tNoN ≥ κu(qNoN−qN )−tNoN ) for every
choice of (qN , qNoN ) ∈ F0 (respectively, (qN , qNoN ) ∈ F1).
The inequality ∆p > κu(qNoN − qN )− tNoN yields xN > 0.
The first result of the lemma follows.
Now, we prove the second statement. From (5)-I, xN < 1
is equivalent to:
∆p < tN + κu(qNoN − qN ) (31)
Consider ∆p < tN − κuq˜f . Note that:
∆p < tN − κuq˜f ≤ tN + κu(qNoN − qN )
for every choice of 0 ≤ qN ≤ q˜f and 0 ≤ qNoN ≤ q˜p which
are all the possible choices in F . The inequality ∆p < tN +
κu(qNoN − qN ) yields that xN < 1. The result follows.
The following lemma characterizes all the candidate answers
when x∗N ≤ 0, and characterize the necessary condition on
parameters for this solutions to be feasible.
Lemma 8. Let (q∗N , q∗NoN ) ∈ FL. If (q∗N , q∗NoN ) ∈ FL0
(respectively, if (q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ FL1 ), then q∗NoN = q˜f (respec-
tively, q∗NoN = q˜p). Moreover, for every x ∈ [0, 1κu (κuq˜f −
tNoN −∆p)] (respectively, x ∈ [0, 1κu (κuq˜p − tNoN −∆p)])
and ∆p ≤ κuq˜f − tNoN (respectively, ∆p ≤ κuq˜p − tNoN ),
(x, q˜f ) (respectively, (x, q˜p)) constitutes an optimum solution
in FL0 (respectively, in F
L
1 ).
Proof: From (5)-I, xN ≤ 0 is equivalent to:
∆p ≤ κu(qNoN − qN )− tNoN (32)
Note that from (5)-I, if xN ≤ 0 then nN = 0 and nNoN = 1.
In this case, the payoff of the CP is,
piG = κadqNoN − zp˜qNoN (33)
Note that the value of the payoff is independent of qN as
long as nN = 0, and from (5)-I nN is a function of qN and
qNoN . In addition, note that if there exist a qNoN that satisfies
the constraint ∆p ≤ κu(qNoN − qN ) − tNoN (and therefore
nN = 0) then q′NoN ≥ qNoN also satisfies this constraint.
Therefore for q′NoN ≥ qNoN , nN = 0 and (33) is true. Note
that from Lemma 4, (33) is an increasing function of qNoN .
Thus, if xN ≤ 0, then q∗NoN = q˜f if (q∗N , q∗NoN ) ∈ FL0 or
22That is FL0 is an empty set.
23That is FL1 is an empty set.
24That is FU is empty.
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q∗NoN = q˜p if (q
∗
N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ FL1 (using the feasible sets in
Table I-I and their definitions).
Using (32), (q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ FL0 (respectively, (q∗N , q∗NoN ) ∈
FL1 ) if and only if,
q∗N ≤
1
κu
(κuq˜f−∆p−tNoN )
(
respectively, q∗N ≤
1
κu
(κuq˜p−∆p−tNoN )
)
(34)
Note that every q∗N that satisfies (34) is an optimum answer
since when (q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ FL, nN = 0 and q∗N is of no
importance. Also, note that qN ≥ 0. Thus, (34) is true
for at least one q∗N if ∆p ≤ κuq˜f − tNoN (respectively,
∆p ≤ κuq˜p − tNoN ). The result follows.
The following lemma characterizes all the candidate answers
when xN ≥ 1, and characterize the necessary condition on
parameters for this solutions to be feasible.
Lemma 9. If (q∗N , q∗NoN ) ∈ FU , i.e. optimum strategies
are such that x∗N ≥ 1. Then q∗N = q˜f . Moreover, for all
x ∈ [0, 1κu (κuq˜f − tN + ∆p)] and ∆p ≥ tN − κuq˜f , (q∗N , x)
constitutes an optimum solution in FU .
Proof: From (5)-I, xN ≥ 1 is equivalent to:
∆p ≥ tN + κu(qNoN − qN ) (35)
Now, we prove the first result of the lemma. Note that from
(5)-I, if xN ≥ 1 then nN = 1 and nNoN = 0. In this case, the
payoff of the CP is,
piG = κadqN (36)
Note that the value of the payoff is independent of qNoN as
long as nN = 1, and from (5)-I, nN is a function of qN and
qNoN . In addition, note that if there exist a qN that satisfies
∆p ≥ tN + κu(qNoN − qN ), then q′N ≥ qN also satisfies this
constraint. Therefore, for q′N ≥ qN , nN = 1 and (36) is true.
Note that (36) is an increasing function of qN . Thus, q∗N = q˜f
(using the feasible sets in Table I-I and their definitions).
Using (35), (q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ FU if and only if:
q∗NoN ≤
1
κu
(κuq˜f − tN + ∆p) (37)
Note that every q∗NoN that satisfies (37) is an optimum answer
since when (q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ FU , n∗NoN = 0 and q∗NoN is of
no importance. Also, note that qNoN ≥ 0. Thus, the condition
(37) is true for at least one q∗NoN if κuq˜f − tN + ∆p ≥ 0. The
result follows.
Corollary 5. If (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) ∈ FL0 , then (qeqN , qeqNoN ) =
(0, q˜f ). If (q
eq
N , q
eq
NoN ) ∈ FL1 , then (qeqN , qeqNoN ) = (0, q˜p). If
(qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) ∈ FU , then (qeqN , qeqNoN ) = (q˜f , 0).
Proof: Note that when (q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ FL (, respectively
(q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ FU ), then the payoff of the CP is independent
of q∗N and q
∗
NoN . Thus, result of the corollary follows from
Tie-Breaking Assumption 1-I.
Theorem 5. All possible equilibrium strategies are:
(0, q˜f ) ∈ F I0 ∪ FL0 , (q˜f , 0) ∈ F I0 ∪ FU0 , (q˜f , q˜f ) ∈ F I0 ,
(0, q˜p) ∈ F I1 ∪ FL1 , (q˜f , q˜p) ∈ F I1
(38)
Proof: Results follow directly from Corollaries 4 and 5.
Note that (38) and (10)-I are exactly similar. This implies
that the strategies chosen by the CP when she chooses from
continuous sets is exactly similar to the strategies when she
chooses from the discrete set characterized in our model. This
completes our proof.
